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NEW TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I
First Amendment Identity Crisis on the Information
Superhighway
A. What is Wrong With This Picture?
In addition to triggering an avalanche of bad metaphors, the pop-
ularization of the expression "electronic superhighway" 1 has perpetu-
ated confusion in the First Amendment analysis of new
communications technologies. The "Infobahn" promises to bring new
broadband networks and a convergence of media, but it is also leading
to a First Amendment identity crisis.
Consider the following scenario:
A federal regulator walks into a room and is confronted with five
television sets, each displaying the same program. The show features
a steamy sex scene between a man and a woman, complete with
nudity, adult language, and lots of sweat. Although transparent to the
viewer, each television is fed via a different transmission source. The
first television is receiving a terrestrial broadcast transmission, the sec-
ond obtains the images by coaxial cable, the third is connected to a
fiber optic common carrier network, the fourth is hooked to a VCR,
and the fifth is receiving a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) feed.
Leaving aside any questions of federal versus local jurisdiction and
assuming that the images are not obscene, what is the regulator's con-
stitutional authority to control these images?
The answer is, it depends.
For broadcast transmission, it depends upon whether the images
are sufficiently salacious to be considered "patently offensive" based
1. A monthly technology supplement to the WASHINGTON POST has launched a con-
test to search for a better term. See Giving the Information Superhighway a Good Name,
WASH. POST FAST FORWARD, Sept. 1994, at 4. "Bad enough the phrase resonates with the
oaken earnestness of Vice President Al Gore, the guy responsible for introducing it to the
public. Far worse are the dozens of winky 'highway' metaphors, all too cute by half, that
have thumbed a ride: 'Toll booth.' 'Traffic cops.' 'Road kill."' Id. Such a reaction is
understandable in light of the following metaphorical hash used to describe new infrastruc-
ture investments designed to "create as much infobahn spaghetti-with cybersauce as we
can cook up to throw on the wall and see what sticks with our customers." MULTICHAN-
NEL NEWS, Oct. 3, 1994, at 100. On the legislative front, a bill was introduced just before
April 1, 1994 to make it a crime "to use a computer network while intoxicated" (that is,
banning drunk driving on the Information Superhighway). See April Fool's Day on the
Data Superhighway; Prankster Reports Bill Would Ban Drunk Driving on Networks,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1994, at C3. This being said, the author apologizes for the repeated
use of the expressions "Information Superhighway" or "Infobahn" at various places in this
Article.
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on "contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium."
2
It also depends on whether the telecast is at a time when there is a
"reasonable risk that children may be in the audience"-a concept
that is far from settled.3 Assuming these conditions are met, the gov-
ernment may require that the telecast be restricted to an appropriate
time of day. With respect to the cable connection, the government's
ability to regulate is far more limited. Various courts have held that
indecency regulations are invalid when applied to cable television.4
As with broadcast television, however, the law remains a work in pro-
gress. With respect to the third television, a court would likely apply
the cases relating to "dial-a-porn" to the fiber optic common carrier
network.5
The answer is even more murky with respect to televisions four
and five. While there is much logic and some case law to suggest that
the VCR-originated images would receive the same constitutional
protection as the print media,6 the issue never has been formally re-
solved by the courts.7 The appropriate First Amendment standard for
2. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978) (quoting Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)). This notion of com-
munity standards specific to "the broadcast medium" may well be a moving target follow-
ing the success of NYPD Blue.
3. Thus far, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has rejected the
FCC's reasoning regarding the times during which there is a "reasonable risk" that chil-
dren will be watching or listening. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d
1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) (twenty-four-hour indecency ban
rejected); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (re-
jecting 12 a.m. to 6 a.m. as a "safe harbor" period).
4. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United
States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1993); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkin-
son, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (C.D. Utah 1985), affd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986), affd mem., 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City,
555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987
(C.D. Utah 1982). See generally Jessica Sporn, Note, Content Regulation of Cable Televi-
sion: "Indecency" Statutes and the First Amendment, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
141 (1985).
5. Dial-a-porn regulations were twice struck down as being too restrictive of adults'
rights to receive sexually-oriented telephone messages. Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Carlin Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) (judicially acceptable regulations fashioned
by the FCC); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
Dial Info. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d.1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966
(1992); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928
F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress attempted to ban all interstate dial-a-porn calls, includ-
ing calls that were indecent but not obscene, but this measure was invalidated as a First
Amendment infringement. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
6. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
7. Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Comment, What Films We May Watch: Videotape Distri-
bution and the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1284 (1988).
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DBS transmissions is even further from resolution. Because satellite
programmers operate as broadcasters, making their transmissions
freely available to all receivers, they would be subject to the same
statutory requirements as terrestrial television stations.' Additionally,
Congress has determined that DBS operators shall be subject to many
of the same "public interest" obligations as traditional broadcasters. 9
But as a constitutional matter, the spectrum scarcity that has served to
justify less First Amendment protection for broadcasters appears in-
applicable to DBS operators who may be able to provide hundreds of
video channels.
It is likely to take years for the hypothetical federal regulator to
know the constitutional limits of his authority with respect to the five
televisions. If case law develops as it has in the past, it is possible-if
not probable-that the five transmissions would be governed by dis-
tinct First Amendment standards. By the time those legal standards
are in place, there undoubtedly will be a sixth television, fed by com-
puter-generated images, and perhaps even a seventh, receiving trans-
missions from some other source such as terrestrial microwaves.10
Certainly there are differences between the various transmission
media beyond what may be apparent to the casual viewer. Broadcast
signals come to the home free of charge and can be received by any
television within range of the transmission; cable television and com-
mon carrier fiber optic links require a physical connection and are (or
will be) provided to customers by subscription; video tapes must be
obtained from some external source and require additional hardware
for playback; and DBS requires specialized receiving equipment and
will be provided, for the most part, by subscription. But do these dif-
ferences support constitutional distinctions between the various
media?
Printed material comes in many forms and is distributed in a wide
variety of economic arrangements. Leaflets, handbills, and some
newspapers are distributed without charge and are made available to
all within the range of the publisher. In addition to such free distribu-
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
9. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinaf-
ter 1992 Cable Act].
10. Various microwave delivery systems already exist, including satellite master an-
tenna television (SMATV), multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS), and lo-
cal multipoint distribution service (LMDS). Each provides customers with programming
otherwise available on cable television systems.
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tion, newspapers and magazines are sent through the government mail
system and sold on public rights of way. Some printed material can be
read only with the aid of specialized equipment, such as a microfilm or
microfiche reader, an electronic book, or a personal computer. Text
may be transmitted to the computer screen from a floppy disk or CD-
ROM format, from an on-line service, or, it is anticipated, from some
over-the-air source. Despite these differences, the print media all are
subject to the same First Amendment protections (although this prop-
osition is largely untested with respect to electronic texts).'
1
This Article explores whether the First Amendment standards ap-
plicable to various communications media are consistent with settled
constitutional principles and whether such a multi-faceted approach
can be sustained in light of rapid technological change. It examines
the history of constitutional treatment of new technologies and how
the First Amendment status of communications media generally cor-
responds to the regulatory classification scheme established by the
government. Initially, new technologies are given little or no First
Amendment protection. As each medium gains cultural penetration
and becomes more mainstream, courts are increasingly willing to rec-
ognize its First Amendment status.
This evolutionary process has become more difficult and less reli-
able as the pace of technological change has accelerated and as regula-
tory distinctions among media have blurred. Accordingly, courts have
been left with little guidance for developing new standards, as demon-
strated by the search for the First Amendment status of broadcasting,
cable television, and common carriage. The search for a coherent ap-
proach has been impeded by the use of such metaphors as the "elec-
tronic superhighway," which tends to focus on the method of
transmission. A regulatory and judicial preoccupation with the mode
of communication-as opposed to the fact of communication-has
perpetuated the current confusion over constitutional standards. This
Article concludes that a more unified First Amendment approach
would reduce confusion and more reliably preserve constitutional
values.
11. See Tamar Lewin, Dispute Over Computer Messages: Free Speech or Sex Harass-
ment?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at Al; Couple Convicted of Using Computer to Send
Pornography, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A2. But see Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("A computerized database is the functional
equivalent of a more traditional news vendor."); Tung Yin, Post-Modern Printing Presses:
Extending Freedom of the Press to Protect Electronic Information Services, 8 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 311 (1993).
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B. Traditionalism, Incrementalism, and Revisionism
Various theoretical approaches have been formulated to fill this
void in judicial doctrine. This Article separates the theories into three
categories: the incrementalist perspective, the revisionist perspective,
and the traditionalist perspective. Incrementalism defends the ex-
isting method of gradual application of free speech rights to new me-
dia. Proponents of this approach support having different levels of
protection for different media, reserving full protection only for print,
and concluding that freedom of expression is maximized in the system
as a whole. Revisionism generally supports the expanded use of regu-
latory power over new media based on a similar utilitarian balancing
approach. Government intervention is justified under revisionist the-
ory to the extent that it results in more speech, thereby serving First
Amendment values. By contrast, the traditionalist perspective main-
tains that the First Amendment's principal command is the separation
of press and state. It rejects the idea that government may obtain
some optimal level of public discourse by intervening in the choices of
private speakers. Under this approach, traditional understandings of
First Amendment law would be applied to all media.
The Article concludes that the traditionalist perspective provides
the only stable method of analyzing new media under the First
Amendment. The incrementalist approach has brought us to where
we are today, with different standards for different media and no clear
guidelines for the future. Worse still, the constitutional foundations
upon which existing regulations are based (such as radio spectrum
scarcity) are eroding, while the underlying premise of incremental-
ism-that each medium is a law unto itself-loses meaning as the vari-
ous media converge. Revisionism, by contrast, elevates policy
preferences over constitutional principle. Common among revisionist
theories is the selection of a transcendent First Amendment "value"
that overrides the command that "Congress shall make no law ... ,"
quite often to the exclusion of other First Amendment values. Such
theories tend to overestimate the government's ability to correct per-
ceived deficiencies in the marketplace of ideas and vastly underesti-
mate the dangers of making the attempt. Moreover, when revisionist
theory proposes different First Amendment treatment based on the
medium of communication, it suffers from the same problem that
plagues incrementalism: technology evolves faster than the law can
change, thus undercutting the factual predicates of regulation.
The traditionalist perspective, on the other hand, should help
simplify First Amendment adjudication by ending the seemingly end-
less search for the appropriate standard for each medium. Instead,
1994]
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well tested analytic approaches would be brought to bear in each case,
such as whether the government's interest is compelling, whether the
regulatory means chosen are sufficiently narrow, and whether the gov-
ernment's interest is served. These and other traditional First Amend-
ment inquiries may be readily applied without regard to the medium
of transmission. Doing so avoids the confusion of multiple standards
and ends the need to constantly reassess the First Amendment as new
media emerge. It also allows the law to adapt more quickly to new
factual developments, and thus provides more stable and predictable
protection for new forms of expression.
Some may characterize the traditionalist perspective as simply
applying the "print model" of the First Amendment to all electronic
media. While it has this effect, a traditionalist understanding of the
First Amendment goes further. It suggests that the search for differ-
ent models, whether the "print model," the "broadcast model" or
something else, is inherently futile. Any model that is based on the
particular characteristics of a given medium becomes obsolete as tech-
nology evolves.' 2 Moreover, the typically long periods in which courts
and policymakers grope for new models lead to confusion as well as to
the use of interim standards that often undermine free speech values.
C. Cable Television at the Crossroads
The Cable Communications and Consumer Protection Act of
1992's (1992 Cable Act) focused attention as never before on the First
Amendment status of cable television operators and programmers.
As part of a sweeping bid to re-regulate the cable industry, the 1992
Cable Act imposed a wide variety of new obligations on cable opera-
tors, including must-carry provisions for commercial and noncommer-
cial broadcasters,' 4 retransmission consent,'5 leased access channel
rate regulation,'6 indecency restrictions on both leased access and
public access channels,'17 notice requirements for previews of unsolic-
ited R-rated movies on premium channels,' 8 and vertical and horizon-
tal ownership limits.' 9 Not surprisingly, a First Amendment challenge
was filed the same day the must-carry requirements became law. A
12. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1063 (1994).
13. See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 9.
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. IV 1992).
15. Id. § 325(b).
16. Id. § 532(c).
17. Id. §§ 531, 532(h).
18. Id. § 544(d).
19. Id. § 533(f).
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broad-based First Amendment attack also was brought against most
other provisions of the 1992 Cable Act.
20
As these cases have progressed; the central question has been the
selection of a First Amendment standard for cable television. In Tur-
ner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC2' (Turner Broadcasting), argued
in the Supreme Court on January 12, 1994, the government argued
that must-carry rules trigger only minimal scrutiny as "a reasonable
attempt to correct ... market dysfunction" that restricts the transmis-
sion of broadcast signals.22 While acknowledging that "cable televi-
sion is not affected by the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum," the
government asserted that cable should be governed by a constitutional
standard "comparable" to that applied to broadcasting.23 Alterna-
tively, the government argued that must-carry rules could be upheld
under what it described as the "more exacting standard" of United
States v. O'Brien,24 which is applicable to content-neutral regulations
that have incidental effects on speech.25 The district court had upheld
the must-carry rules using this constitutional standard.26
The cable industry, in sharp contrast, argued that First Amend-
ment "strict scrutiny," the standard applicable to printed communica-
tions, should be used to analyze the must-carry rules. The rules,
according to the industry briefs, are content-based because they com-
pel carriage on the grounds that local broadcast signals convey infor-
mation important to the public interest.27 On a more general level,
however, the industry argued that none of the characteristics of cable
communications justified a lower level of constitutional scrutiny.
Cable television operators do not have power to distort the market for
television signals, according to the industry, and such economic power
does not justify a different constitutional approach. 28 Nor do such
purported factors as a scarcity of physical space to place cables or the
20. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
21. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
22. Appellee's Brief at 13, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).
23. Id. at 14, 32-36.
24. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
25. Appellee's Brief at 37-47, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).
26. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 41 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. at 16-23, Turner
Broadcasting (No. 93-44); Brief for Appellant Time Warner Entertainment Co. at 14-21,
Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).




receipt of a government benefit via franchise rights support a lower
First Amendment standard.29
The debate in Turner Broadcasting regarding the applicable First
Amendment standard for cable television brought to a head an ongo-
ing dispute of the past two decades. While the Supreme Court in 1979
described First Amendment concerns about cable access program-
ming requirements as "not frivolous," it did not take a position on the
correct approach to such requirements.30 In the years since, the Court
has expressly avoided articulating a First Amendment standard for
cable television.31 Given this void, lower courts have been forced to
find their way as best they can in the constitutional thicket. This led
litigants to propose "clever and flavorful analogies to other corners of
[F]irst [Ajmendment law on which more light has been shed," to help
courts decide the necessary threshold question of what law to apply.
32
At least until the government's current position in Turner Broad-
casting was set out, most could agree that the First Amendment stan-
dard for broadcasting was inapposite. In Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC,33 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit noted that "the First Amendment theory es-
poused in National Broadcasting Co. and Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential pre-
condition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring
an umpiring role for government-is absent.
34
While most courts in the ensuing years concluded that the First
Amendment standard for broadcasting was inapplicable to cable tele-
29. Id. at 32-33, 36-38.
30. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,709 n.19 (1979). The dispute regarding
the First Amendment status of cable goes back even further if one includes those cases in
which free speech claims were summarily rejected. E.g., Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC,
399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968); Buckeye Cablevision v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Idaho Microwave v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Carter Mountain Transmis-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
31. Leathers v. Medlock, 449 U.S. 439 (1991); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Com-
munications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986). See also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 1808 (1993) (denying application for injunction). "[W]e have not
decided whether the activities of cable operators are more akin to that of newspapers or
wireless broadcasters." Id.
32. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clari-
fied, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
33. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
34. Id. at 44-45 (citations omitted). See also Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), affd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488
(1986); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982); Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 131 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television, Inc. v.
Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1168-69 (N.D. Utah 1982).
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vision, they could not agree on a uniform constitutional approach.
Some courts justified even greater regulation of cable television on
the theory it is a natural monopoly, 36 while others rejected this propo-
sition.37 The debate outside the courtroom has been no less intense.
Some have argued that cable television systems are like newspapers
and should be accorded full First Amendment status.38 Others have
focused on the distinctive characteristics of cable technology, or on
various public policy goals, and have argued that cable television
should be subject to a less demanding constitutional regime.39
The Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting stopped short of
resolving this dispute. Although the Court emphasized that "[t]here
can be no disagreement" that "[clable programmers and cable opera-
tors engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the pro-
tection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment," it
did not articulate a standard for evaluating these rights.' It agreed
with the cable industry that the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to
broadcasting "does not apply in the context of cable regulation" be-
35. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, VIDEO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION AND
CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, NTIA REPORT
88-233, Appendix C (June 1988). Various courts expressly eschewed any attempt to set a
standard for cable. E.g., Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 298; Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Pacific West Cable Co. v.
City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
36. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Omega Satellite Prods., 694 F.2d at 128; Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I.
1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
37. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994); Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1449-50; Preferred
Communications, 754 F.2d at 1396; Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1322; Century Fed., Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
38. E.g., JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1991); LUCAS A. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
216-47 (1987); GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL., CABLESPEECH (1983); John P. Cole, Jr., The
Cable Television "Press" and the Protection of the First Amendment-A Not So "Vexing
Question," 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 347 (1991); William E. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First
Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867 (1983); David J. Saylor, Municipal Ripoff: The Uncon-
stitutionality of Cable Television Franchise Fees and Access Support Payments, 35 CATH. U.
L. REV. 671 (1986).
39. E.g., Jerome A. Barron, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable:
Some Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495 (1989); Daniel L. Brenner, Cable
Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J. 329; Nicholas P. Miller & Alan
Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85 (1981); Monroe E. Price, Con-
gress, Free Speech, and Cable Legislation: An Introduction, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
225 (1990).
40. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F.
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
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cause of "fundamental technological differences. ' 41 It also rejected
the government's assertion that market dysfunction justified "indus-
try-specific antitrust legislation" in the form of must-carry rules, sub-
ject only to rational basis scrutiny.42 Accordingly, the Court found
that "at least some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny
is demanded.
43
At the same time, however, the Court did not accept industry
arguments that strict scrutiny must be applied to must-carry rules. It
rejected the notion that broadcast carriage obligations are content-
based, either in purpose or effect, and concluded that burdens were
imposed on cable operators "only because they control access to the
cable conduit. ' 44 As with constitutional questions relating to other
technologies, the Court predicated its findings upon "the unique phys-
ical characteristics of cable transmission" but foreshadowed the time
when such characteristics may be less pivotal. Indeed, the majority
noted that "given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital com-
pression technology, soon there may be no limitation on the number
of speakers who may use the cable medium.
45
Even before such advancements are available, however, the
Court was unwilling to find that must-carry rules are constitutional.
Thus, it remanded the case to determine whether the economic health
of broadcasters actually was at risk and whether the must-carry rules
are an appropriately tailored means of addressing the problem. In
particular-and despite "unusually detailed statutory findings"-the
Court found no evidence that broadcast stations had been harmed by
cable operators, no findings regarding the adverse effects of must-
carry on cable programming services, and no judicial findings on less
restrictive measures that might be available.46 In short, the decision
means that the debate over the First Amendment status of cable tele-
vision, as well as the constitutionality of must-carry rules, will
continue.
Although the Turner Broadcasting decision did not end the de-
bate, it may mark a judicial shift toward a more traditionalist ap-
41. Id. at 2456-57.
42. Id. at 2458.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2460. The Court also pointed to "an important technological difference be-
tween newspapers and cable television .... [T]he cable network gives the cable operator
bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming that
is channeled into the subscriber's home." Id. at 2466.
45. Id. at 2457. See also National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
46. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2461, 2472.
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proach to electronic means of communication. For example, the
Court in dictum stressed the government's limited role in regulating
broadcast content. It pointed out "the minimal extent to which the
FCC and Congress actually influence the programming offered by
broadcast stations."47 With respect to cable television, the Court
adopted intermediate scrutiny as the relevant constitutional standard,
but declined to defer to the congressional judgment on must-carry
rules.4" Instead, it stressed that the government must show that the
rules do not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests" and remanded the case
for further findings. 49 This appears to set a higher hurdle for the gov-
ernment than the Court's other First Amendment cases that employ
intermediate scrutiny." However, the extent to which this decision
represents a movement toward traditionalism will more effectively be
evaluated after the Court reviews the government's factual showing.'
II
The Real Issue: Applying the First Amendment to
New Technologies
While Turner Broadcasting and other cases suggest a shift toward
greater First Amendment recognition for new technologies, the deci-
sions continue to emphasize the means of transmission. Accordingly,
one experienced observer of developments in telecommunications law
47. Id. at 2464. The Court noted that
the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any par-
ticular type of programming that must be offered by broadcast stations; for
although "the Commission may inquire of licensees what they have done to deter-
mine the needs of the community they propose to serve, the Commission may not
impose upon them its private notions of what the public ought to hear."
Id. at 2463 (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960)).
48. Id. at 2461.
49. Id. at 2470.
50. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798-99 (1989); Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).
51. Recent cases analyzing the First Amendment rights of telephone companies pro-
vide some additional support for the movement toward a traditionalist approach.
Although no different First Amendment standard has emerged, courts increasingly have
used intermediate scrutiny to strike down restrictions barring telephone companies from
providing cable television service. See Ameritech Corp. v. United States, Nos. 93-C-6642
& 94-C-4089, 1994 WL 594706 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1994); BellSouth v. United States, No. CV
93-B-2661-5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1994); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184
(W.D. Wash. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993).
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has snidely noted that the courts have begun to recognize "yet another
First Amendment right: the right to string wires on poles.
'5 2
Nevertheless, this is a somewhat strange statement in the First
Amendment context. Logically extending its emphasis on the method
of transmission, the statement suggests that "freedom of the press" is
nothing more than the right to spread ink on paper. Lofty statements
about a free press being the bulwark of human liberty tend to lose
their punch when one is focused on the messy and technical elements
of the printer's art. It is strange as well in light of Vice President
Gore's insistence that new communications media on the wired net-
work will "entertain as well as inform. [T]hey will educate, promote
democracy, and save lives."53 The Vice President based his vision on
the understanding that the various media are converging. If the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure is to provide this rebirth of free ex-
pression and democratic ideals, how could it be that the means of
providing it is less worthy of constitutional protection?
The idea of denigrating the First Amendment status of cable and
other technologies by virtue of their means of delivery underscores an
essential point that often is obscured in the debate: the outcome of
the current controversy will determine not just the First Amendment
rights of cable operators, but of all electronic publishers.54 The consti-
tutional standard for cable television likely will define the rules of the
road for the electronic superhighway. Thus, choices made today re-
garding the right to speak electronically will determine the vitality of
the First Amendment in the next century.
A. Transition to the Multimedia Age
By the time the Supreme Court takes a stand on cable television's
First Amendment status, cable, as we know it, could be a relic of the
past. Some people suggest this is already happening with broadcast-
ing. Although broadcasting continues to be a healthy industry, its de-
mise has been predicted with increasing frequency, 55 and broadcasters
52. Kenneth Robinson, Implications of the Court's Video Programming Decision:
Telcos Will Enter the Cable Industry in a Big Way, THE CABLE-TELcO REPORT, Sept. 13,
1993, at 13.
53. Vice President Al Gore, Speech to the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences at
University of California, Los Angeles (Jan. 11, 1994), reprinted in 8 DAILY REP. FOR EXEC-
UTIVES (BNA), Jan. 12, 1994, at M-1, M-3.
54. See, e.g., Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.
1993) (considering First Amendment status of DBS operators); Potomac Telephone, 830 F.
Supp. at 909.
55. See KEN AULETTA, THREE BLIND MICE: How THE TV NETWORKS LOST THEIR
WAY (1991); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS, REGULATORY POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL
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have become uneasy about being left behind on our nation's trip down
the electronic superhighway.56 At the same time, while many courts
have questioned the continuing validity of the scarcity doctrine, they
have thus far avoided revisiting a First Amendment standard predi-
cated on the particular technical and market characteristics of the
broadcasting industry circa 1969.57 Most likely by the time the
Supreme Court reconsiders Red Lion Broadcasting, traditional broad-
casting will be less potent in the context of other new technologies.
The same fate may await cable television.
Vice President Gore has proclaimed that, like our Universe,
current communications industries-cable, local telephone, long
distance telephone, television, film, computers, and others-seem to
CHANGE (OPP Working Paper No. 24, Nov. 1988) [hereinafter THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS]. Some advertising executives have suggested that within the foreseeable future the
networks' "days as a mass medium will be over." See also Bill Carter, Little Improvement
in Sight As Networks End Bad Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at 29 ("[A] senior network
executive, who insisted on remaining anonymous [stated,] 'We're presiding over networks
as they head out of business."'); Joshua Levine, The Last Gasp of Mass Media?, FORBES,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 176-82; William Mahoney, Network Woes Are Barter's Gain, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Mar. 25, 1991, at 16 (According to Tim Duncan, Executive Director of the Adver-
tiser Syndicated Television Association, the networks' ability "to deliver 99 percent of the
nation at the flip of a switch ... isn't the case in many network dayparts anymore. 'That
doesn't exist outside of prime time and shortly will not exist in prime time."'); Tom Shales,
The FCC and the Threat to Free TV, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1991, at C1, C2; Tom Shales, The
Endangered NBC Peacock, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at B1, B2; Diane Werts, Glued to
the Tube; Look Who's Watching, NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 1990, at 59 ("[Tlhe networks are
dying, and single-interest cable channels are premiering monthly."); Richard Zoglin,
Goodbye to the Mass Audience, TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 122 ("era of the mass TV audience
may be ending"). However, reports of broadcasting's demise may be just a bit premature.
See Geoffrey Foisie, TV Finances Fare Mostly Better, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 7,
1994, at 42.
56. See Christopher Stern & Kim McAvoy, Broadcasters Claim Stake on Superhigh-
way, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 48.
57. The constitutionality of broadcast regulation is not an immutable fact; it is based
on "'the present state of commercially acceptable technology' as of 1969." News America
Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969)). See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 867
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has noted that "because the broadcast industry is
dynamic in terms of technological change[,] solutions adequate a decade ago are not neces-
sarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence." CBS,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). Both courts and commentators
have questioned the continuing validity of the scarcity rationale for the constitutionality of
regulating broadcast content. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 376-77 n.11 (1984); Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network
Found., 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (McMillan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Ar-
nold, C.J., concurring); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,
506-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987); Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443,
1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1005-06 (2d ed. 1988) ("reconsideration [of the scarcity argu-
ment for broadcast regulation] seems long overdue").
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be headed for a Big Crunch/Big Bang of their own. The space be-
tween these diverse functions is rapidly shrinking-between com-
puters and televisions, for example, or inter-active communication
and video. But after the next Big Bang, in the ensuing expansion of
the information business, the new marketplace will no longer be di-
vided along current sectoral lines. There may not be cable compa-
nies or phone companies or computer companies, as such.
Everyone will be in the bit business. The functions provided will
define the marketplace. 8
This is not a new insight, but it is an especially important point. Over
a decade ago Ithiel de Sola Pool described the "convergence of
modes" that is "blurring the lines between media." He noted that
"[a] single physical means-be it wires, cables, or airwaves-may
carry services that in the past were provided in separate ways. Con-
versely, a service that was provided in the past by any one me-
dium-be it broadcasting, the press, or telephone-can now be
provided in several different physical ways."59
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment found that
"technology is ushering in a convergence of forms of press publishing
that were once partitioned by technology: print publishing, mail,
broadcasting, and telephone."60 This change in the media environ-
ment has complicated the once-simple task of regulatory
classification. 6
This phenomenon is causing extensive changes in communica-
tions networks, with trends toward reduced costs, declining sensitivity
to distance, faster communications, increasing information traffic,
greater channel diversity, increasing interactivity, increasing flexibility
and expandability, and increasing interconnectivity.62 More relevant
for purposes of this Article, however, is the fact that this evolution is
changing the concept of a cable system. FCC Commissioner Andrew
Barrett has pointed out that "to pursue the multimedia future, cable
companies must replace their existing one-way, coaxial-based net-
works with optic-fiber based interactive information superhigh-
58. Gore, supra note 53.
59. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 23 (1983). See also Mark S.
Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the Medium From the
Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 166 (1983).
60. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, OTA-CIT-369 27 (Jan. 1988).
61. See generally Jill A. Stem et al., The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a
Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 571-76 (1983).
62. W. Russell Neuman, The Technological Convergence: Television Networks and
Telephone Networks, in TELEVISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEXT WAVE 3-17 (C.
Firestone ed., 1993). See also WILSON DIZARD, OLD MEDIA/NEW MEDIA 38-56 (1993);
GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION: THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIA
AND AMERICAN LIFE (1992).
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ways."6 3 In fact, this transformation is already underway. Since 1989,
the use of fiber optics by cable operators has increased by 675 percent
and is expected to grow by twenty-five percent annually through the
next decade.6' Most cable plant installed since 1987 has interactive
capability, and certain projects, such as Time Warner's "Full Service
Network" in Orlando, are using digital switching to provide such serv-
ices as two-way video, video on demand, interactive full-motion video
educational services, and interactive video games.65
Changes affecting the cable television industry are not occurring
in a vacuum. Technology is evolving which promises to expand the
individual citizen's access to information. In addition to the technical
advancements in the cable industry, telephone companies are pursu-
ing the development of video and data networks, both independently
and with cable partners;6 6 the FCC has authorized wireless two-way
data transmission;67 high-powered DBS service is now available in
many parts of the country, opening the door to a competitive method
of digital video delivery;68 interactive information for personal com-
puters and other consumer devices is available on CD-ROM;69 and
on-line computer services are becoming very popular, delivering many
services, including interactive newspapers and magazines.7°
These developments are unlike previous transformations of me-
dia technology. The introduction of steam-powered presses and inex-
pensive pulp paper in the mid-nineteenth century made possible book
and newspaper publication on a mass, scale, but it was essentially an
enhancement of an existing method of communication. 71 The second
transformation, brought about by the introduction of broadcasting, in-
troduced a new means of conveying information,72 but it was not a
63. Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications
in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 40 (1993).
64. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION Ass'N, TWENTY FIRST CENTURY TELEVISION 9
(1993).
65. Id. at 15, 33.
66. Barrett, supra note 63, at 40-48.
67. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Commu-
nications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7700 (1993).
68. Paul Farhi, Satellites Beam Down Competition to Cable & TV Firms, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1994, at Al; Kent Gibbons &. Linda Haugsted, DSS Reaches 100K Subs, Goes
National, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 10, 1994, at 1. See also Rich Brown, Prices for DBS
Programming Launched, BROADCASTING & CABLE,.Jan. 3, 1994, at 47.
69. DIZARD, supra note 62, at 26-29. See Langberg, Gabriel Brings CD-ROM Into the
Rock Revolution, WASH. Bus., Jan. 24, 1994, at 21.
70. E.g., David Shaw, "Electronic" Newspaper Emerging After Slow Start, L.A. TIMES,
June 3, 1991, at Al; David Shaw, Inventing the "Paper" of Future, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1991,
at Al.




substitute for print or speech. Each medium continued to play a dis-
tinct role in the information marketplace. The current transformation
of the media is, however, distinct. Multiple methods of delivering
video images are evolving, including multimedia forms that combine
video and print. Print can be delivered electronically and, with inter-
active capability, assumes some attributes of speech. Many examples
of convergence can be described, but the current transformation is not
conducive to analyzing new media forms in terms of their particular
characteristics.73
B. Historical Treatment of New Technologies
1. Cycles of Repression
In many ways, censorship is the bastard child of technology.
Before the printing press, government suppression of expression was
largely unnecessary and seldom practiced. There was no central au-
thority over scribes, nor was there any need for one. They worked in
isolation on individual manuscripts, which largely were incapable of
causing a major controversy. 74 But the advent of the printing press
changed all of that. Commonly cited examples of censorship of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were direct reactions to "a new
communications environment in which dissatisfied individuals pos-
sessed a capacity for finding, allies or reaching others in ways that had
not existed previously."'77 Accordingly, it "is no accident that shortly
after Gutenberg invented the printing press, official authorities in-
vented the first censorship bureau."' 6 As M. Ethan Katsh explained
in his book, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law:
The spread of printing in the last half of the fifteenth century
created a new communications environment that undermined the
authority of powerful institutions. Those whose power derived from
their ability to control the written word were threatened by a re-
duced ability to control the new medium of print. As a result, many
censorship laws were enacted, trials held, and punishments meted
73. See, e.g., Robert Corn-Revere, Multimedia and the Future of the First Amendment,
QUIcKTIME FORUM, Sept./Oct. 1993, at 20, 22.
74. POOL, supra note 59, at 14-15. See also M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC ME-
DIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 136 (1989). "Writing itself was mainly a means of
acquiring and exercising power but was not a threat to power. Those in power did not
worry about it or have to censor it." Id.
75. POOL, supra note 59, at 15-16. See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SoCIETY 337-38 (1992); L.R. SUSSMAN, POWER, THE PRESS AND THE TECHNOLOGY
OF FREEDOM 10-12 (1989); THE FIRST AMENDMENT-THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOL-
ooY 9-11 (Sig Mickelson & Elena Mier Y Teran eds., 1989); M. Ethan Katsh, The First
Amendment and Technological Change: The New Media Have a Message, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1459, 1467 (1989).
76. SMOLLA, supra note 75, at 338.
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out. By the late sixteenth century, 'censorship of the printed word
had become the universal practice of the lay and church authorities
throughout Europe.'
77
Governments employed censorship because of an acute aware-
ness that the authority of the state waned as the power of the press
ascended. Press licensing laws were "an attempt to foster books that
promoted only the values or interests of the authorities, something the
scribal system did automatically.
78
Yet even as the new technology of print increased the govern-
ment's need to censor, it thwarted the accomplishment of the state's
objective. The ability of the press to mass produce books and other
works negated most efforts to exert control.79 In Britain, the govern-
ment successively attempted state monopolies, press licensing, taxa-
tion, and criminal libel as methods of restricting the press."0 In the
end, such attempts were abandoned, not "due to any philosophical
conclusion concerning the advisability of a free press but primarily to
an inability to devise an enforceable system of regulation capable of
achieving the results desired.""1
Consequently, the rise and fall of government regulation over the
press has tended to be cyclical. New technologies tend to increase
pressure for government control by challenging established state poli-
cies and by threatening to undermine official authority. The govern-
ment responds by enacting measures to reassert its authority and to
otherwise regulate the press. Such efforts ultimately fail because of
the power of a given technology or because of technological expan-
sion of the means of communication. This evolutionary process rein-
forces movement toward a system of free expression.
2. The American Experience With New Technologies
By adopting the First Amendment, the United States became the
first nation to embrace the new technology as an essential component
of its political system. This choice evolved not only from the colonists'
experience with suppression, but from the framers' appreciation for
77. KATSH, supra note 74, at 137-38 (quoting MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTAND-
ING MEDIA 85 (1964)). See also POOL, supra note 59, at 14-15; Lee Loevinger, Earl F.
Nelson Lecture: Law, Technology and Liberty, 49 Mo. L. REV. 767, 777 (1984).
78. KATSH, supra note 74, at 142. See also POOL, supra note 59, at 15-16.
79. Katsh, supra note 75, at 1469-70. It has been suggested that as new electronic
communications technologies become universal, "censors will be overwhelmed, and finally
made superfluous." SUSSMAN, supra note 75, at 12.
80. POOL, supra note 59, at 15-16.
81. KATSH, supra note 74, at 145 (quoting THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 22 (1922)).
See also POOL, supra note 59, at 146-65.
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"the highly active and uninhibited communications environment" that
print made possible. 2 The nature of the technology and the actual
practices of publishers of the period may be a better guide to under-
standing the First Amendment than attempts to divine the intentions
of the framers by dissecting their words or reading contemporary
common law. While "[t]he particular words chosen for the First
Amendment may have been fortuitous or accidental,... the evolution
of a law that was more protective, of expression than anything that
existed pre-Gutenberg was not.
'8 3
However, while the new technology of the printing press was
"born free" in the United States, this break with tradition was not
sufficient to end the cycle of repression. As new technologies have
been introduced, courts and other policymakers have been slow to
recognize their First Amendment status. Professor Laurence Tribe
has noted that the decisions "reveal a curious judicial blindness, as if
the Constitution had to be reinvented with the birth of each new tech-
nology."84 Thus, contrary to the First Amendment tradition, and par-
ticularly with the rise of the regulatory state, new technologies now
are born in captivity. 5
Examples are not hard to find. In 1915, film was too new a me-
dium to qualify for constitutional protection as "speech." The
Supreme Court in a trilogy of cases 6 upheld the authority of state
censorship boards to subject moving pictures to prior restraint. The
Court found, as a matter of "common sense," that the constitution was
inapplicable to cinema. 7 The technology of film poses a special dan-
ger that "a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to," and the
Court noted that "there are some things which should not have picto-
rial representation in public places and to all audiences."88 It con-
cluded that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not
82. KATSH, supra note 74, at 147.
83. Id. at 148. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
(1985).
84. Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic Frontier, Keynote Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom &
Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991).
85. See generally Donald E. Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror
Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1985). See also Karl A. Groskaufmanis, What Films We May
Watch: Videotape Distribution and the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L, REV. 1263, 1284
(1988).
86. Mutual Film Corp. of Mo. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915); Mutual Film Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 247 (1915); Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n
of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
87. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244.
88. Id. at 242.
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to be regarded... as part of the press of the country or as organs of
public opinion."89
Courts first confronted the First Amendment status of broadcast-
ing in 1932 and were reluctant to extend constitutional protection to
this new medium. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio
Commission,9° the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld against constitutional attack a Federal Radio
Commission (FRC) decision to revoke a radio station license.91 The
FRC argued in its brief to the court that broadcasting is not protected
speech under the First Amendment.92 Although the court did not ex-
clude radio from constitutional protection in the same stark terms
used by the Supreme Court in reference to film seventeen years ear-
lier, the result was the same. It described radio as a mere "instrumen-
tality of commerce," and upheld the license revocation as simply an
"application of the regulatory power of Congress in a field within the
scope of its legislative authority." 93
The "application of regulatory power" at issue was the denial of a
license renewal because of a licensee's intemperate attacks on public
officials and for broadcasts that were "sensational rather than instruc-
tive."94 The Supreme Court declined to review the holding, even
though it had struck down a Minnesota press law a year earlier on
strikingly similar facts.95 When it finally did consider the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters, the Court recognized some appli-
cation of constitutional protections, but at a lower level than to "tradi-
tional" media.96
89. Id. at 244.
90. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
91. The FRC was the predecessor agency to the Federal Communications
Commission.
92. See POWE, supra note 38, at 16. When placed in historical context, the FRC's posi-
tion may not seem so extreme. See, e.g., Monroe E. Price, Congress, Free Speech, and
Cable Legislation: An Introduction, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 225, 230 (1990). "At
the outset, radio was perceived primarily not as a medium for speech, but as a device to aid
ships at sea .... No substantial body of thought conceived of radio or television in their
infancy, as a new form of newspaper." Id.
93. Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 851.
94. Id.
95. Trinity Methodist Church, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). Cf Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (scandalous attacks on public officials by newspaper protected from prior re-
straint). For an insightful comparison of the two cases, see POWE, supra note 38, at 13-21.
96. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 192 (1943).
1994]
A growing number of courts have questioned the factual predi-
cates underlying the constitutional status of broadcasting.' For more
than six decades, the law has allowed greater government intrusion
into the editorial processes of broadcasters than traditional media.
Courts have continued to be reluctant to revisit the First Amendment
standard for broadcasting, despite overwhelming evidence that the
conditions supporting the weaker constitutional protections have
changed.9" Courts have shown a similar ambivalence about applying
First Amendment protections to cable television.
The practice of extending First Amendment rights incrementally
has been supported rhetorically by treating different communications
delivery methods as being constitutionally distinct. As Justice Robert
Jackson wrote in his concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper99 :
The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the hand-
bill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing na-
tures, values, abuses and dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself.1°
This oft-repeated maxim of First Amendment jurisprudence that
"differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in
the First Amendment standards applied to them"' 1 has been institu-
tionalized through regulatory classification schemes. Differences in
the characteristics of new media first result in some type of categoriza-
tion, and each category is accorded different treatment in constitu-
tional inquiries. Or, as the FCC's Office of Plans and Policy noted,
"[t]he regulatory/legal world is ruled by definitions."' 2
3. The Regulatory State and Freedom of Expression
When different methods of communication were created and put
to commercial use, the government classified the media according to
the types of services provided and subjected them to various levels of
regulation. The Communications Act of 1934103 set out the basic reg-
ulatory models: private radio, broadcasting, common carrier, and-
97. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12, 386 n.11 (1984);
Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring);
Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
98. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1019 (1990); Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
99. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
100. Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
101. Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 386.
102. See THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 55.
103. Ch. 652, 48 Stat.'1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-926 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
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with the addition of the Cable Communications Act of 1984-cable
television.
Broadcasting, typified by over-the-air radio or television, is de-
fined as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be
received by the public."'' Moreover, broadcast licensees are charged
with certain public trustee obligations. These include requirements
that licensees serve their community needs and interests,10 5 that licen-
sees provide reasonable amounts of air time to candidates for federal
elective office"° and "equal opportunities" to appear on air to candi-
dates at all levels whose opponents have appeared,0 7 that licensees
not transmit obscene or indecent programming,' 0 8 and that television
licensees provide sufficient amounts of educational programs for
children." 9
Common carriers, typified at least originally by standard tele-
phone service providers, are defined as "any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy.""10
This definition also stresses that "a person engaged in radio broadcast-
ing shall not . . . be deemed a common carrier.""' Title II of the
Communications Act requires carriers to provide service upon reason-
able request, at reasonable rates and without discrimination between
customers." 2 Unlike broadcasters, common carriers have no editorial
control over communications-they merely transmit information of a
customer's design and choosing.
1 3
Private radio covers all users of the radio spectrum that are not
involved in broadcasting or common carrier service. The regulatory
category is a catchall for "nationwide and international uses of radio
104. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o).
105. Id. § 307(c); Malrite TV of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. National Football League v. FCC, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
107. Id. § 315(a).
108. Id. § 312(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b).
110. Id. § 153(h).
111. Id.
112. Id. §§ 201-202. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 US. 992 (1976) [hereinafter NARUC I].
113. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[Tihe sine qua non of a common carrier is the obligation to accept applicants on a non-
content oriented basis."); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-55
(1958). See Note, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
409, 428 (1981). But see Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988); Carlin Communications,
Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1986).
1994]
by persons, businesses, state and local governments, and other organi-
zations licensed to operate their own communications systems for
their own use as an adjunct of their primary business or other activ-
ity."' 14 Eligibility for private carrier status is generally limited to pub-
lic safety radio services, special emergency radio services, industrial
radio services and land transportation radio services. 1 5 Service within
a designated category is no guarantee of regulatory treatment as a
private operator. If a licensee acts as a common carrier within its
range of permissible service by holding itself out indiscriminately to
serve all those who may benefit from its particular offering, it will be
treated as a common carrier. 1 6 The practical consequence of qualify-
ing for private carrier status is exemption from broadcast or common
carrier regulations." 7 However, private radio operators are not en-
tirely unregulated. The Commission imposes various technical and
procedural rules to allocate radio spectrum and to ensure its orderly
use.
118
Cable television initially defied classification as either broadcast-
ing or common carriage. To resolve this confusion, Congress created a
regulatory definition in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
(1984 Cable Act), defining a "cable system" as
a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associ-
ated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is
designed to provide cable service which includes video program-
ming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a
community." 9
The 1984 Cable Act provides guidelines for cable regulation through
local franchising, with the proviso that cable systems "shall not be sub-
ject to regulation as a common carrier or utility.' 20 However, it is not
entirely clear what this statement means. Although the 1984 Cable
Act avoids imposing certain indicia of common carrier status, it treats
cable operators as common carriers in other respects. For example,
114. 47 C.F.R. § 0.131 (1993).
115. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 90 (1990).
116. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 642-44.
117. Id. at 645.
118. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 90 (1990). See generally Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report and
Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982) (describing rules for private, industrial, transportation, and
safety services).
119. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1988). The 1984 Cable Act expressly excludes from the defini-
tion (1) a facility that serves only to retransmit the signals of one or more television sta-
tions; (2) a facility that serves only subscribers in multiple dwelling units under common
ownership, management or control (so long as no public rights-of-way are used); (3) com-
mon carrier facilities regulated under Title II of the Communications Act unless video
programming is transmitted directly to subscribers; and (4) facilities of electric utilities
when used solely for operating electric utility systems. Id. § 522(7).
120. Id. § 541(c).
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operators are required to set aside channel capacity under reasonable
price, terms, and conditions for "leased access" by unaffiliated enti-
ties. Rates in most communities are regulated according to complex
formulas, and operators are prohibited from exerting any editorial
control over the leased access programming.' 2'
The importance of regulatory nomenclature is nowhere more evi-
dent than in the FCC's authorization of video dialtone-a common
carrier service. Video dialtone was conceived as a competitive alter-
native to traditional cable television service. 22 However, the condi-
tions for providing such service were crafted to carefully avoid the
statutory definition of "cable service," thus avoiding the regulatory
requirements of cable, even though the service may be virtually indis-
tinguishable to the consumer.
23
Particularly with the traditional classifications, designation of a
regulatory pigeonhole has a profound effect on determining the rele-
vant constitutional standard. For example, courts have recognized
sharply different First Amendment rights for broadcasters compared
to common carriers. Nevertheless, dictum that "of all forms of com-
munication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection"'1 24 is somewhat misleading. Common carri-
ers are given less protection in terms of operators' editorial control. 25
This difference was highlighted in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee. 26 The Court held that a broadcast licensee could have a blanket
policy of refusing to air paid editorial announcements without running
afoul of the public interest mandate of the 1934 Communications
Act.127 In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the legislative
121. Id. § 532. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 532(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
122. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 5783 (1992), affd sub nom. National
Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
123. National Cable Television Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 75. "[Sltudy of the statutory scheme
makes it quite clear that video dialtone service and cable service are very different crea-
tures." Id.
124. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
125. But see BellSouth Corp. v. United States, No. CV 93-B-2661-5 (N.D. Ala. filed
Sept. 23, 1994); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993) (strik-
ing down cross ownership restrictions on common carriers using First Amendment
rationale).
126. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
127. Id. at 105-14.
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history of the Radio Act of 1927128 and the Communications Act of
1934129 and found that Congress considered "-and firmly rejected-
the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a non-
selective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues.
1 3 °
After all, the Court reasoned, the Communications Act of 1934 speci-
fies that a person "engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be
deemed a common carrier."' 31 Common carriers, then, would appear
to receive the lowest level of First Amendment protection, for they do
not have a recognized right to speak on their own and are denied edi-
torial control over their communication traffic.
132
Broadcasting, at least in some important respects, has been ac-
corded less First Amendment deference than its closest video compet-
itor, cable television. Even without a fully articulated constitutional
standard for cable television, courts have held that certain regulations
permissible for broadcasters could not be applied to cable televi-
sion.133 This is illustrated by the FCC's policy restricting indecent ra-
dio and television programming.134 In 1988, the FCC issued a notice
of forfeiture to a Kansas City television station for a prime-time
broadcast of the uncut film Private Lessons, holding that the movie
was "indecent" within the meaning of the United States Criminal
Code. The film depicted the seduction of a teenage boy by his govern-
ess and contained some nudity. Although the notice was later with-
128. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, §§ 1-3, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. VII, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102.
129. See supra note 103.
130. CBS, Inc., 412 U.S. at 105.
131. Id. at 108-09 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988)).
132. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987);
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). But see Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988);
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir.
1986); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
133. E.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754
F.2d 1396, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1985), affd on narroiver grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Century
Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-75 (N.D. Cal. 1984). However,
earlier cases, decided before the cable industry developed as a serious competitor to broad-
casting, treated the two technologies as constitutionally indistinguishable. Black Hills
Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968). See Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1443-44
(citing cases on both sides of the issue).
134. The FCC's constitutional authority to regulate indecent broadcast programming
was recognized in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). However, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the narrowness of its Pacifica Foundation holding. See Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
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drawn on other grounds, it was the first time the Commission stated
its intention to fine a television licensee for indecent broadcasts. 35
But Private Lessons and other films of the "teen sex comedy"
genre have been staples of many premium movie channels on cable
television and are routinely transmitted with impunity. Certain local
jurisdictions have attempted to ban "indecent" cable programming us-
ing almost identical language as that chosen by the FCC to regulate
broadcasting, but courts have invalidated these laws. 36 The courts
found that "fundamental differences between the broadcast medium
and cable television require that [government power to regulate inde-
cency] not be extended to cable television.' 37 Of course, in certain
other respects described above, such as with FCC signal carriage
rules' 38 or local access requirements,'139 cable operators have enjoyed
less First Amendment protection than broadcasters.
One consequence of the role assigned regulatory classifications is
that courts must determine the correct category before addressing the
substance of First Amendment claims. In City of Chicago v. Day,"4
the Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois was asked to decide
whether a satellite master antenna television system (SMATV) should
be classified as a cable television system and subjected to franchising
requirements under the federal cable act. The court refused to con-
sider First Amendment defenses, saying "[f]or [defendant's] argument
to have any legal merit, it would have to prove that it is a SMATV
system. However, this it has failed to do."'' The court reasoned that
the defendant would first be required to submit to regulations appro-
priate to its regulatory category before sorting out its constitutional
status.
42
135. In re Kansas City Television, Ltd., Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6706 (1989). Virtually all
forfeitures for broadcast indecency have involved radio stations.
136. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (C.D. Utah 1985), affd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800
F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), affd mem., 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Community Television, Inc. v.
Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.
Supp. 987 (C.D. Utah 1982).
137. Community Television of Utah, 611 F. Supp. at 1109-10.
138. Interestingly, the Supreme Court rejected the government's assertion that cable
television should be evaluated by the lower First Amendment standard applicable to
broadcasters, but it arguably upheld access requirements that exceed those constitutionally
permissible for broadcasting. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456
(1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30
(1994). But cf. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1993).
139. Chicago Cable Communications, Inc. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 678 F. Supp. 734
(N.D. I1. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S..1044 (1990).
140. No. 88-MC-313994 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1990).
141. Id., slip op. at 8.
142. Id., slip op. at 8-9.
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Given the overriding importance of regulatory classification to
constitutional analysis, the question arises as to the level of scrutiny
courts should bring to the government's classifications. The Supreme
Court addressed this question, although not on First Amendment
grounds, in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.143 The case involved
the same issue as City of Chicago v. Day: whether a SMATV system
could be subjected to franchising requirements under the 1992 Cable
Act. The Court of Appeals had struck down a statutory distinction
that exempted SMATV systems from franchising requirements where
such systems connected commonly owned or managed buildings (and
to the extent no public rights of way were crossed) while subjecting to
regulation identical SMATV systems that connected buildings not
commonly owned or managed. 4 4 The appellate court held that the
statutory definition violated the implied equal protection guarantee of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it was "un-
able to imagine" any conceivable basis for the distinction.
145
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that the
1992 Cable Act's definition of a cable system that excluded certain
SMATV systems while including others was entitled to the presump-
tion of having a rational basis. "In establishing the franchise require-
ment," the Court noted, "Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it
had to choose which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the
precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually un-
reviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a
perceived problem incrementally."'14 6 Like the D.C. Circuit, however,
the Court emphasized that it was limiting its review to whether the
regulatory classification is "rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose under the Due Process Clause."' 47 Whether heightened
First Amendment scrutiny should apply-particularly in light of the
"burdens imposed on franchised cable systems under the newly en-
acted [1992 Cable Act]"-was a question left open for the Court of
Appeals to decide on remand. 48
As the regulatory divisions among the various media become less
distinct, it may well be that the government will face an increasing
obligation to justify its media classification scheme. Increasingly,
143. 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993).
144. Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1992), aff'd following
remand, 965 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at 987. The court expressly declined to address the SMATV operators' First
Amendment claims, holding them to be "unripe." Id. at 984-85.
146. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2102.
147. Id. at 2101 n.6.
148. Id.
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broadcasters, common carriers, and cable operators are providing the
same or similar services. As this occurs, each segment of the industry
will gain a more sound basis for arguing that it has been unreasonably
singled out for burdensome treatment based on regulatory classifica-
tions that have little to do with real world distinctions between the
media. In short, convergence of the media will undermine the system
of regulatory classifications and will undercut the rationale for differ-
ent constitutional treatment of the media.
C. The Cycle Continues
Just as precolonial regulatory schemes faded as it became evident
that they were no match for the technology they attempted to control,
regulation of new media in the United States tends to relax over time.
Courts have always seemed somewhat uneasy about the "law unto it-
self" approach to First Amendment analysis. Perhaps for that reason,
once a communication technology is no longer novel, they have
honored that dictum more in the breach than in the observance. Me-
dia pegged with one of the traditional regulatory classifications, par-
ticularly broadcasting, have been most susceptible to separate
treatment, but even that tendency may be changing.
Courts' ambivalence toward the command to treat each medium
differently has been underscored by their recognition of traditional
First Amendment values. Thirty-seven years after the Supreme Court
held that cinema was not "speech," it expressly overruled Mutual Film
Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio'4 9 and found that "ex-
pression by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and free press guarant[ees] of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."' 5 ° Although the Court felt compelled to observe that
"[e]ach method [of communication] tends to present its own peculiar
problems," it more importantly found that "the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's com-
mand, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been
enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule."''
Thus, as a particular medium becomes more commonplace, the
recognition of "core values" tends to outweigh the rhetoric regarding
its "peculiar problems." At the same time, however, dictum about the
149. 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overruled in part by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
150. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952). See also United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). "We have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment." Id.
151. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503.
1994]
uniqueness of each communications medium lives on long after courts
have chosen to apply traditional First Amendment doctrine. The
Court's rejection in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson of an almost four-
decade-old precedent that excluded film from constitutional protec-
tion is a clear example of this phenomenon. Rather than create a new
First Amendment theory tailored to the medium, the Court relied on
established First Amendment prohibitions against prior restraint and
discriminatory taxation of the traditional press. 152  Although the
Court suggested that the Constitution does not necessarily require
"absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places," the exceptions it recognized to First Amend-
ment protection were well-settled at the time for established media. 53
Even though subsequent decisions suggested that requiring pre-
distribution submission of films to "censorship boards" is not neces-
sarily unconstitutional, closer examination belies the notion that films
were accorded lesser protection than "traditional media." In Freed-
man v. Maryland,54 for example, the Court struck down a Maryland
film censorship statute as providing inadequate procedural safeguards.
In doing so, the Court applied "the settled rule of our cases" and sug-
gested as a model "a New York injunctive procedure designed to pre-
vent the sale of obscene books."' 55 In short, the Court removed any
basis for treating films differently from print media.'56 It also repudi-
152. The Court expressly relied on Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503 n.14.
153. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502-03 & n.13. The Court cited Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (threat of violent crowd reaction may justify restricting speech); Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (government may regulate decibel level of sound ampli-
fication devices); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words" not
constitutionally protected); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (government may
require parade permits).
154. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The Court held that certain procedures must be followed
where the government seeks to halt distribution of a film. First, the government bears the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the material is unprotected.
Second, any restraint prior to court proceedings is strictly limited to a brief, specified pe-
riod solely in order to maintain the status quo. Third, rapid judicial determination must be
guaranteed. Id. at 58-59.
155. Id. at 58, 60. Virtually all of the precedent cited in Freedman related to the tradi-
tional media. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (obscene books).
156. The one exception the Court allowed was in the time limits prescribed for review
of films as contrasted with that for books. It found that the long lead times generally
associated with film exhibition may lead to a different standard for what constitutes
"prompt judicial determination" of the status of a film as compared to a book. But the
Court laid down no "rigid time limits or procedures" and made no concrete findings other
than "the statute would have to require adjudication considerably more prompt than has
been the case under the Maryland statute." Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60-61.
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ated precedent that suggested otherwise.1 7 Accordingly, the Mary-
land legislature disbanded the state film licensing board in 1981 after
sixty-five years of operation. Censorship boards in all other states had
been abandoned by the mid-1960s. 158 By 1982, the Court was willing
to describe film (at least in dictum) as one of the "traditional forms of
expression such as books" that are protected as "pure speech."' 59
The procedural safeguards applied in Freedman have been used
interchangeably among various media ever since. The Court has re-
quired the same protections in cases involving censorship of mail 6 °
and seizure of imported material by United States customs agents.'
6'
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,62 the Court applied the
same procedural requirements to theatrical performances. Despite
the application of traditional First Amendment doctrine, the Court re-
peated dictum that "[e]ach medium of expression.., must be assessed
by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems.' 1 63  It reasoned, however, that theater generally involves
speaking or singing the written word and found "no reason to hold
theatre subject to a drastically different standard."'" In short, the
rhetoric regarding "peculiar problems" has little effect on the result.
157. An earlier case, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), had
suggested that the government may require submission of motion pictures in advance of
exhibition. But in Freedman, the Court limited the holding in Times Film to the narrow
and very abstract proposition that "a prior restraint was [not] necessarily unconstitutional
under all circumstances." 380 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Court dis-
avowed the notion that Times Film had upheld "the specific features of the Chicago cen-
sorship ordinance." Id. at 54. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion,
"the Chicago censorship system, upheld by the narrowest of margins in Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, could not survive under today's standards." Id. at 62.
158. EDWARD DEGRAZIA & ROGER NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS 147 (1982). By 1992,
Dallas, Texas was the only city in the United States that continued to have a film review
board, and it was eliminated the following year. See Elizabeth Kastor, It's a Wrap: Dallas
Kills Film Board, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1993, at Dl; David Landis, 'Kuffs' Compromise,
USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1992, at Dl. It is interesting to note that mainstream films began to
include more realistic depictions of reality-particularly sexual relations-after the demise
of licensing boards. To respond to this trend, the film industry in 1968 established a volun-
tary rating system (on a scale of G to X) to provide guidance to prospective audience
members. See Hal Hinson, The 20-Year Rating Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at G1.
Although the rating system does not necessarily pose a First Amendment problem, it has
been subject to increasing criticism. See Miramax Films, Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 560
N.Y.S.3d 730 (1990) (rating system is "an effective form of censorship"); Kim Masters,
Judge Blasts Movie Rating System, WASH. POST., July 20, 1990, at Al.
159. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).
160. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1971).
161. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971).
162. 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975).
163. Id. at 557.
164. Id. at 557-58.
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This coincidence of traditional First Amendment protection and
cultural penetration of a given medium is more problematic when ap-
plied to newer communications technologies. The classification of
new media for regulatory purposes tends to institutionalize, and
thereby prolong, distinct constitutional treatment. Government con-
trol over broadcasting is the clearest example of this phenomenon.
Commercial television existed for more than forty years and was a
dominant social force before courts began to reconsider their constitu-
tional approach. Most observers have concluded that the original jus-
tification for special treatment of broadcasting-the purported
scarcity of frequencies-has for years been nothing more than a legal
fiction. 65
Still, the increasing tensions that have taken the luster off the
"public trustee" model for broadcasting seem to have persuaded a
number of courts to be more concerned about the First Amendment
concerns inherent in regulation. Accordingly, they have begun to ana-
lyze free speech claims of broadcasters by giving less weight to, or by
not relying at all on, the "special" nature of the medium. In FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California,166 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statutory prohibition on editorializing by public broadcasting
stations that received funds from the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting. Although the Court expressly upheld the "public trustee"
concept of constitutional analysis over strict scrutiny, it subjected the
government's asserted interests to a far more rigorous analysis than
ever before and questioned the continuing validity of the scarcity ra-
tionale. 67 The Court conducted a thorough review of the purposes of
public broadcasting and the legislative objectives and found that the
ban on editorializing was too broad and did not serve the asserted
165. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 88-90 (1991) (describing
the rationale of Red Lion Broadcasting as having "devastating-even embarrassing-
deficienc[ies]," as "illogical," and as being based on "the simple-minded and erroneous
assertion that public regulation is the only allocation scheme that can avoid chaos in broad-
casting"); HENRY GELLER, FIBER OPTICS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW POLICY? 15
(1991) ("[T]he broadcast regulatory model is a failed concept," and "the public trustee
scheme.., is a joke."); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982); Lively, supra note 85, at 1085-86.
166. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
167. Id. at 376-78. See also id. at 376-77 n.11 (noting criticisms of scarcity rationale, the
Court indicated that it would be willing "to reconsider our longstanding approach" if given
"some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required"). "Were it to
be shown by the Commission that the fairness doctrine '[has] the net effect of reducing
rather than enhancing' speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional
basis of our decision in [Red Lion Broadcasting]." Id. at 378-79 n.12.
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governmental interests. 68 As in other cases of the "law unto itself"
genre, the Court continued to pay lip service to the "public trustee"
concept, but it emphasized that "the broadcasting industry is indispu-
tably a part [of the press]" and supported its ultimate conclusions with
precedents involving traditional media.
169
In Turner Broadcasting, a case analyzing the First Amendment
rights of cable television operators, the Court again declined to ques-
tion the scarcity rationale,'170 but limited its importance as a justifica-
tion for broadcast content controls. To support its conclusion that
compelling cable operators to carry local broadcast signals is content-
neutral, the majority emphasized "the limited nature of [the FCC's]
jurisdiction" over the content of television programming.' 7' In partic-
ular, the Court noted that
the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to or-
dain any particular type of programming that must be offered by
broadcast stations; for although "the Commission may inquire of
licensees what they have done to determine the needs of the com-
munity they propose to serve, the Commission may not impose
upon them its private notions of what the public ought to hear.'
' 72
Lower courts have been willing to dispense with the public
trustee doctrine or to apply its First Amendment precepts in a far
stricter way. In Community Service Broadcasting of Mid-America,
Inc. v. FCC,1 7 3 the D.C. Circuit emphatically noted that "spectrum
scarcity cannot be invoked to support a government attempt to penal-
ize or suppress speech, based on its general content, by some, but not
all, broadcast licensees. ' 174 The court's plurality opinion stated that
168. Id. at 384-99.
169. Id. at 382 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166
(1948), in which the Court for the first time stated that "[wie have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment"). See also id. at 382-99 (citing, inter alia, Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)).
170. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 114 S. Ct. 2445,2457, vacating and remanding 819 F.
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994) (finding the scarcity analysis to
be "inapt" in the context of cable television).
171. Id. at 2463.
172. Id. (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960)). Of special relevance to the congressional mandate regarding chil-
dren's programming, 47 U.S.C. § 303(b), the Court noted that noncommercial broadcast-
ers-and by implication their commercial counterparts-"are not required by statute or
regulation to carry any specific quantity of 'educational' programming or any particular
'educational' programs." Id.
173. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
174. Id. at 1111 n.21.
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under either strict scrutiny or the O'Brien test for incidental speech
restrictions, a requirement that public broadcast stations make and re-
tain recordings of programs "in which any issue of public importance
is discussed," violated the First Amendment.175 Similarly, in News
America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC,'7 6 the D.C. Circuit demanded "a bet-
ter fit between the law and its asserted legitimate purposes" than was
evident in a congressional restriction on the FCC's ability to grant
waivers of the newspaper-television cross-ownership rule. 77 The
court pointedly outlined the weakness of separate constitutional treat-
ment based on spectrum scarcity, but noted that even under the public
trustee doctrine, regulations must be narrowly tailored to further a
substantial government interest. 78 It found the cross-ownership limit
to be "astonishingly underinclusive," and unconstitutional.1
79
Even when the courts have rejected First Amendment claims,
they have begun to do so without reference to scarcity. In United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court upheld against a
First Amendment challenge a prohibition on the broadcast of lottery
advertisements in states that did not have a government lottery. 180
Although the decision is a highly fragmented one in which seven jus-
tices supported the outcome for various reasons, none relied on the
rationale of Red Lion Broadcasting. Indeed, no justice even cited
it.'8 ' The Court's decision ultimately rested on the commercial speech
doctrine as articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York.'8 2
The change in judicial attitudes toward broadcasting is shown by
the language courts use in framing their constitutional analyses. As
Dean Lee Bollinger has observed, the Red Lion Broadcasting Court
"never referred to the broadcast media as the press nor to broadcast-
ers as editors or journalists; they were consistently described as licen-
sees and fiduciaries."' 83 A different view has emerged in later cases.
175. Id. at 1111-22. Only four judges (Wright, Bazelon, McGowan, and Wilkey) en-
dorsed this section of the opinion. Judge Robinson found that the regulation could not
survive even minimal scrutiny and found it unnecessary to apply a stricter test. Id. at 1127
(Robinson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
176. 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
177. Id. at 805.
178. Id. at 810-12.
179. Id. at 814.
180. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
181. Id. See also Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 519 (D. Nev.
1993), in which the court invalidated a prohibition of broadcast advertising of casino gam-
bling using the Central Hudson test. The court did not mention Red Lion Broadcasting or
the public trustee standard. Id.
182. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
183. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 91.
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The Supreme Court has stated that "broadcasters are engaged in a
vital and independent form of communicative activity" and that "the
First Amendment must inform and give shape to the manner in which
Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area."1 4 The recogni-
tion of broadcasters as being an essential element of the press has
been even more direct among the lower courts. As the D.C. Circuit
noted in Community Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v.
FCC,1 85 public affairs programming on broadcast stations "lies at the
core of the First Amendment's protections."' 86 This rhetorical shift is
significant.
As they did with film a generation ago, courts appear to be dis-
tancing themselves from the historic justifications for separate consti-
tutional treatment of broadcasting. In certain cases, this has meant
increased First Amendment scrutiny of regulations, even as courts
continue to recite some of the time-worn dictum about the "special
characteristics" of broadcasting. In other cases, courts have directly
eschewed reliance on prior justifications. Perhaps courts have not
taken the next logical step of reconsidering Red Lion Broadcasting to
avoid creating legal uncertainty in an increasingly confusing media
marketplace. Alternatively, one observer has suggested that courts
will refuse to take this step until they have devised a new theory that
would continue to permit government control of the media.18 7
Whatever the explanation, it seems evident that courts will have to
modify their present approach. The same is true of the courts' current
treatment of cable television.
D. This Ain't No Way to Run an Electronic Superhighway
All signs suggest that we are on the brink of a major shift in First
Amendment doctrine. At the same time, federal policymakers are fo-
cused on the development of the National Information Infrastructure.
The evolution of such a "network of networks" will have profound
implications for future constitutional analyses. Will notions of scarcity
184. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984). See also CBS,
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (holding broadcasters are "entitled under the First
Amendment to exercise the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their] public
[duties]").
185. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
186. Id. at 1110. "[N]oncommercial licensees are fully protected by the First Amend-
ment." Id. See also Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); News
Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Johnson v. FCC, 829
F.2d 157, 161-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
187. See, e.g., Lively, supra note 85, at 1085. "What may be evinced is a long-standing
mind-set, traceable to Mutual Film, that the risk of abandoning control premises, no matter
how unpersuasive or irreconcilable with the first amendment, is unacceptable." Id.
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continue to play a role, or will the physical characteristics of the net-
work be the most important factor? To what extent will regulatory
classifications circumscribe the First Amendment treatment of new
technologies? Each of these questions will have to be addressed over
time. However, if history can teach, the lesson should be this: gradual
evolution of constitutional rights based on regulatory classifications is
utterly unsuited to the new media environment.
1. The Glacial Pace of Doctrinal Change
There is a wide and growing chasm between the rate of techno-
logical change and that of legal development. The case-by-case legal
process by which courts seek to define the appropriate constitutional
standard for a given medium typically takes decades, while the com-
munications industry is evolving far more quickly. If anything, the dis-
parity between the two is growing. As the nation moves steadily
toward creation of broadband, digital, and interactive networks, the
courts and policymakers continue to debate the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine.'88
As Professor Rodney Smolla has perceptively pointed out,
"[s]cientists move more quickly than lawyers."' 89 This is especially
true when the lawyers are judges. The fact that courts are reluctant to
resolve the difficult questions raised by emerging technologies is not
new. The Supreme Court delayed taking up cases on the status of
radio, perhaps because it found the new medium too intimidating.
Chief Justice Taft is reported to have explained his lack of eagerness
to tackle issues relating to radio as follows:
[I]nterpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to in-
terpret the law of the occult. It seems like dealing with something
supernatural. I want to put it off as long as possible in the hope that
it becomes more understandable before the court passes on the
questions involved.190
If any of these feelings are shared by members of the modern judici-
ary, who may not have grown up with computers, the prolonged
search for a new constitutional standard becomes understandable.
188. POOL, supra note 59, at 7; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1007 (2d ed. 1988); Katsh, supra note 75, at 1493. See also Robert Corn-Revere, Con Fair-
ness Doctrine-A Bad Idea Just Keeps Going, Going-Wrong, QUILL, Mar. 1994, at 39;
Gigi Sohn, Pro Fairness Doctrine-A Practical Solution for Handling Irresponsibility,
QUILL, Mar. 1994, at 38; Richard E. Wiley, 'Fairness' in Our Future?, QUILL, Mar. 1994, at
36.
189. SMOLLA, supra note 75, at 321.
190. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 40
(1959) (quoting C.C. DILL, RADIO LAW 1-2 (1938)).
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The shifting legal status of electronic eavesdropping under both
constitutional and statutory law further illustrates the problems asso-
ciated with evolving technology. In 1928, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 91 The Court found no constitutional violation because the
surveillance was accomplished without intruding on the physical prop-
erty of the defendant."9 By failing to acknowledge that technology
permitted the government to intrude on communications in a way that
previously was impossible, Chief Justice Taft (still no futurist) was
able to conclude that "[t]here was no searching [and there] was no
seizure.' 93 The Fourth Amendment "does not forbid what was done
here" because "[tjhe United States takes no such care of telegraph or
telephone messages as of mailed sealed letters."' 94
Justice Brandeis, whose views ultimately prevailed, argued in dis-
sent that constitutional principles were being undermined because the
Court was focused excessively on the method chosen for communica-
tion. He argued forcefully that constitutions must be interpreted with
technological advancements in mind to preserve fundamental rights.
In particular, Justice Brandeis wrote, constitutions must be designed
"to approach immortality" and "our contemplation cannot only be
what has been but of what may be.' 1 95 Anticipating the rise of a com-
puter-based society, he warned that
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government,
by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. . . The pro-
gress of science in furnishing the government with means of espio-
nage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions....
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?
196
Justice Brandeis concluded that if the courts did not adapt to new re-
alities, then constitutional principles would be "converted by prece-
191. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
192. Id. at 464.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 473-74 (internal quotations omitted).
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dent into impotent and lifeless formulas" and that "[r]ights declared in
words might be lost in reality.' '1
97
The Court eventually adopted Brandeis' view toward wiretap-
ping, but it took nearly forty years to do so. In Katz v. United
States,'98 the Court declared that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places" and held that wiretapping is allowable only after a
valid warrant is issued-the same as for any other search. Congress
enacted legislation to codify the law as set out in Katz, but it soon
became outdated and had to be rewritten.199 The advent of fiber optic
communications networks has created pressure for further legal
change.2°
The very nature of law, with its emphasis on creating certainty,
makes keeping up with rapid technological development difficult, if
not impossible. Even Justice Brandeis, the champion of a dynamic
constitution in Olmstead, wrote that "in most matters it is more im-
portant that the applicable rule of law be settled, than that it be set-
tled right." 0' Consequently, the nature of constitutional adjudication
makes it easy to understand why it took thirty-seven years for the
Supreme Court to change its First Amendment approach to cinema,
and why it has continued to spend decades debating the appropriate
standards for broadcasting and cable television.
This time-consuming quest for a stable legal standard creates a
special dissonance in the dynamic field of electronic communications.
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission in 1934
precisely because the communications field was rapidly changing. It
recognized that legislative changes could not keep up with advance-
ments in radio communication. The Communications Act of 1934 was
envisioned as a flexible regulatory system "because the broadcast in-
dustry is dynamic in terms of technological change. 20 2 The adminis-
trative approach it created is predicated on the assumption that
197. Id. at 473.
198. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
199. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-
804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (1968); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521 (1988); see generally Bruce E. Fein, Regulating the Interception and Disclo-
sure of Wire, Radio, and Oral Communications: A Case Study of Federal Statutory Anti-
quation, 22 HARV. J. ON LEG. 47 (1985).
200. See Mark I. Koffsky, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance Data Stream: The Clipper
Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 131 (1994); John Mintz & John
Schwartz, Clinton Backs Security Agencies on Computer Eavesdropping, WASH. POST, Feb.
5, 1994, at Al; Law Enforcement Wants 'Status Quo': Nil Task Force Searches For Privacy
Guidelines, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 3, 1994, at 3.
201. Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
202. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
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"solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and
those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence. 2 °3 Yet
even in a regulatory system based on this premise, it is difficult for the
administrative agency to keep up with changes and adjust its rules ac-
cordingly. Burdensome regulations live on long after their reason for
existence has vanished.2°
So we are left with an evident paradox. On one hand, the law is
criticized for failing to keep up with innovations. On the other, it
seems that the purpose of the law is undermined if it changes too
quickly.20 5 The dilemma is magnified by the accelerating speed with
which innovations are introduced.
However, this is a false paradox. It exists only to the extent that a
new legal standard is expected to emerge with each new transmission
technology. Where First Amendment principles are not dependent on
the specific communications technology, there will be a greatly dimin-
ished perception that the law has not kept pace, for there will be no
expectation of a major doctrinal shift with each new invention. Such
an approach would also preserve the law's function of promoting cer-
tainty. Current conflicts about the appropriate First Amendment
standard for broadcasting and cable television have done more to cre-
ate instability-from the perspectives of both the regulator and the
regulated industries-than perhaps any other single factor in the law.
2. Breakdown of the Classification Scheme
The doctrine that "each [communications medium] is a law unto
itself" 2' makes constitutional analysis exceedingly complex in a world
of burgeoning technology and proliferating classifications. Courts,
policymakers, and legal scholars simultaneously are being presented
with an expansion and contraction of regulatory options. The variety
of delivery systems and media services has multiplied, as have the
number of regulatory classifications. This raises the possibility that a
separate First Amendment test must be applied to each medium and a
new standard developed with each technical innovation. With conver-
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994), affg In re Evalu-
ation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 3282 (1993), and Memorandum Opinion and Reconsideration, 8 FCC Rcd. 8270
(1993). See also Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Report and
Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 3094 (1991), rev'd and remanded, Schurz Communications v. FCC, 982
F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455-57
(1985).
205. KATSH, supra note 74, at 17-19.
206. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
19941
gence, the discrete functions of the various media are coming to-
gether. For example, with the advent of fiber optics it is conceivable
that a single transmission medium could become the conduit for news-
papers, electronic mail, local and network broadcasting, video rentals,
cable television, and a host of other information services.2 °7 The syn-
thesis of form and function vastly complicates segregating the differ-
ent media for separate constitutional treatment.
Courts and legislators generally attempt to fill gaps in legal doc-
trine by analogy rather than by developing new concepts.20 8 Just as
notions of "common carriage" and "public interest, convenience and
necessity" in the Communications Act of 1934 were drawn from nine-
teenth century concepts of transportation law,209 courts usually have
borrowed the constitutional analysis articulated for established media
for application to new technologies. But Ithiel de Sola Pool has cited
the weakness of this approach. He explained that
[a] long series of precedents, each based on the last and treating
clumsy new technologies in their early forms as specialized business
machines, has led to a scholastic set of distinctions that no longer
correspond to reality. As new technologies have acquired the func-
tions of the press, they have not acquired the rights of the press.210
Courts created a genuinely new First Amendment standard for
broadcasting, but they have failed to do the same for cable television
or other new video delivery systems. In the search for a new standard,
the debate comes down to whether the new technology has more char-
acteristics in common with broadcasting than with print. If the me-
207. See generally GELLER, supra note 165; THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note
55.
208. E.g., Harry Kalven Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10
J.L. & ECON. 15, 38 (1967). "Law, it has been said, is determined by a choice between
competing analogies." Id. Policymakers have been forced to develop new analogies as
technology and the communications marketplace have evolved. Former FCC Commis-
sioner Patricia Diaz Dennis half facetiously suggested that broadcasters should be regu-
lated as if they were in a "game preserve," as opposed to the unregulated "jungle"
advocated by opponents of government control or the paternalistic "zoo" favored by pro-
ponents of public intervention. Patricia D. Dennis, Trying a New Policy on for Size, 114
BROADCASTING 41 (1988). Coming up with new concepts to accommodate the rapidly
changing communications landscape is no easy task, and Commissioner Dennis was forced
to admit, "I am no closer to solving this problem than scientists are to coming up with a
unified theory to explain how the universe operates." Id.
209. See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1878); National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); SIG MICKELSON ET AL., THE COMMON CARRIER PRINCIPLE 3-
5 (1989); Comment, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Information Services Restriction:
Applying Time-Worn First Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies, 38 CATH. U. L.
REV. 471, 496-97 (1989); Note, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 409 (1981).
210. POOL, supra note 59, at 250.
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dium is more like over-the-air television, a standard more forgiving of
government intrusion is applied; if it is more akin to traditional pub-
lishing, full First Amendment rights attach.
A basic problem with this approach is that it lacks a principled or
consistent method of application. The similarities among media are
subjective, and the resulting conclusions are mixed. Another problem
is this: what if the real answer is "all of the above?" Multimedia, for
example, is "like" newspapers because it transmits text. It is "like"
books when presented over a personal player on CD-ROM. How-
ever, it is also "like" broadcasting or cable because it may transmit
video, and it may be "like" common carriers when transmitted over
the telephone network. The philosophy that "differences in the char-
acteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them" is illogical in the case of multimedia.21'
One response to this administrative law problem has been the
development of "flexible" classification systems. The number of video
sources has proliferated in recent years, forcing the FCC to develop
various methods of classification. In addition to over-the-air broad-
casting, the FCC issues licenses for services such as direct broadcast
satellites (DBS), multichannel multipoint distribution service
(MMDS), and other microwave video services including operational
fixed service (OFS) and instructional television fixed service (ITFS).
Not only are each of these services classified differently despite a simi-
larity of function, but an operator may choose among various options
to determine its regulatory status.
The FCC first groped for new ways to classify video services in its
1982 order authorizing DBS service.212 The Commission adopted
what it called a "flexible regulatory approach," wherein the service
could be regulated either as broadcasting or common carriage.213 An
operator that retained control over the content of its transmissions
and provided its service directly to homes was treated as a broad-
caster; an operator that leased transponder capacity on a first-come,
first-served basis and relinquished editorial control was treated as a
common carrier. "Customer-programmers" who leased satellite ca-
pacity were essentially unregulated. The D.C. Circuit rejected this ap-
proach and held that the Communications Act definition of
211. Corn-Revere, supra note 73, at 22.
212. Direct Broadcasting Satellites, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), affd in




broadcasting encompasses most DBS applications.21 4 It remanded the
issue of regulatory classification for further consideration. 215
In response, the FCC initiated a proceeding "to determine what
criteria may be used by the Commission to determine whether a com-
munications service should be treated as 'broadcasting' under the
Communications Act. ' 216 The Commission determined that subscrip-
tion video services should be classified as "non-broadcast" services
and freed from broadcast regulation. The appropriate classification
hinges on the operator's intent: the service is not broadcasting if the
licensee does not intend to serve the public generally.217 Based on the
rules announced in Subscription Video, a DBS operator could opt for
regulatory treatment as a broadcaster, a non-broadcaster, or a com-
mon carrier. The D.C. Circuit affirmed.218
3. Current Efforts to Redefine Regulatory Classifications
A growing awareness of the need for regulatory change led to
various "Information Infrastructure" proposals during the 103d Con-
gress. None were adopted. But debate over the several approaches
highlighted different ways to deal with the issue of regulatory classifi-
cation. The selection of a regulatory classification system-when leg-
islation eventually is passed-will have a profound effect on the First
Amendment analysis that ensues.
The Clinton Administration proposed a flexible regulatory classi-
fication system, similar to the FCC's approach to DBS and subscrip-
tion video. The plan was presented as part of the Administration's
National Information Infrastructure Initiative but was not incorpo-
rated into legislation during the 103d Congress. One fundamental
principle underlying the proposal was to "ensur[e] flexibility so that
the newly-adopted regulatory framework can keep pace with the rapid
technological and market changes that pervade the telecommunica-
tions and information industries. '219 This approach frankly acknowl-
edged that government regulation historically "assumed clear,
unchanging boundaries between industries and markets" and that
214. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1205 (1984). See also Tele-
communications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (remand-
ing FCC decision to classify nonsubscription use of ITFS capacity as nonbroadcasting).
215. Telecommunications Research, 836 F.2d at 1362.
216. In re Subscription Video, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 1001, 1003 (1987).
217. Id. at 1006. As indicia of intent, the FCC focused on whether the customer needs a
special encoder to receive the transmission, whether the information is encrypted, and
whether the operator and subscriber are in a contractual relationship. Id.
218. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
219. Clinton Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reform (Jan. 27,
1994), reprinted in 18 DAILY REP. FOR ExEcUTIVES (BNA), Jan. 28, 1994, at M1, M4.
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legal rules based on such perceived distinctions "can harm consumers
by impeding competition and discouraging private investment.
'220
Accordingly, it proposed the creation of a new Title VII of the Com-
munications Act to regulate two-way, broadband, digital transmission
services that are offered on a switched basis to end users.
Subject to certain conditions, service providers would have been
able to "opt" for Title VII regulation and thereby qualify for more
streamlined government oversight. The Title VII classification was in-
tended to provide "a unified, systematic treatment of providers of
two-way broadband services" and to "create a regulatory regime that
should stand the test of time by providing the FCC with the flexibility
to adapt its regulatory approach in light of changes in market and
technological conditions."22
If it had become law, the Administration's proposal might have
gone a long way toward rationalizing the sometimes arbitrary divi-
sions between service providers. However, there was little in the plan
to help solve the difficult problem of developing a new constitutional
standard. The plan retained existing regulatory classifications for
providers that would not qualify (or opt) for Title VII treatment.
More importantly, Title VII itself would require judicial evaluation of
the provider's "special characteristics" to determine the constitutional
status of licensees under that title.
The proponents of Title VII appeared to believe that the new me-
dia qualify for constitutional treatment roughly equivalent to that ac-
corded cable operators and common carriers. In addition to the
technical rules that relate to common carriage, Title VII would au-
thorize the FCC to adopt rules to "address public interest concerns"
such as the transmission of indecent or obscene communications.222
Additionally, Title VII would be designed to "[e]nsure that delivery of
video programming directly to subscribers over broadband facilities is
consistent with certain principles now applicable to cable services...
dealing with: retransmission consent; public, educational, and govern-
mental access; must[-]carry; and protection of subscriber privacy.
'223
Bills introduced in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate during the 103d Congress sought to "foster the further devel-
opment of the Nation's telecommunications infrastructure and protec-
220. Id.
221. Id. at M9.
222. Id. at M10. The Administration specifically cites § 223 of the Communications
Act, which has been used to regulate so-called "dial-a-porn" services.
223. Id.
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tion of the public interest." '224 Senate bill 1822 (S. 1822), House of
Representatives bill 3636 (H.R. 3636), and House of Representatives
bill 3626 (H.R. 3626) were designed to promote competition among
communications industries and growth of the information industries
by, among other things, allowing telephone companies and cable oper-
ators to provide competitive services.225 These legislative efforts
sought to accommodate the problem of convergence, at least as it re-
lates to merging different lines of business, but were somewhat less
directed toward rationalizing disparate regulatory classifications.
For the most part, the proposed legislation retained existing regu-
latory definitions. H.R. 3636, however, would have directed the FCC
to conduct an inquiry "to examine the impact of convergence of tech-
nologies on cable, telephone, satellite, and wireless and other commu-
nications technologies likely to offer interactive communications
services" and to report to Congress on any regulatory changes needed
"to ensure that diversity, competition, and technological innovation
are promoted. '226 Otherwise, the different regulatory regimes re-
mained distinct, at least definitionally. For example, S. 1822 expressly
provided that common carriers providing video services through a
video platform shall not be considered cable operators,227 and H.R.
3636 stated that cable operators would not be required to obtain local
franchises in order to provide common carrier telecommunications
services.228
However, both bills tended to merge regulatory requirements, re-
gardless of technology or classification. In that respect, aspects of
cable regulation, common carriage requirements, and broadcast con-
tent regulations would have become applicable to all technologies.
For example, must-carry and other cable television regulations, such
as public and commercial access rules and franchise fee requirements,
would apply to both cable operators and common carrier providers of
video services.22 9 All telecommunications networks, whether pro-
vided by DBS, MMDS, or common carrier telecommunications plat-
224. Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
225. Id. (dealt with both cross-ownership and consent decree issues); National Commu-
nications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993, H.R. 3636, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (dealt with cable television and telephone company cross-ownership issues,
among other things); H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (focused on lifting consent
decree restrictions on Bell operating companies).
226. H.R. 3636, § 205(b)(1).
227. S. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
228. H.R. 3636, § 102(b)(1). However, H.R. 3636 would also empower the FCC to ex-
tend certain common carrier requirements to cable operators that install a switched, broad-
band video delivery system. Id. § 653(b)(2).
229. Id. § 659(b); see S. REP. No. 367 at 10.
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form would be required to devote up to five percent of their capacity
to provide nonprofit -educational, informational, cultural, charitable,
or civic services. 2 30 The legislation also contained some more tradi-
tional "public interest requirements," such as specialized program-
ming requirements for the disabled,231 and limitations on "indecent"
communications. 32
Of the various "Information Superhighway" proposals debated in
1994, only the Administration's Title VII plan consciously sought to
address the problem of regulatory classification. Legislative proposals
were directed primarily at breaking down certain legal barriers be-
tween service providers, both as to their authorized services and regu-
latory obligations, but they essentially retained existing classifications.
The effort to rewrite the law to accommodate new technologies will
continue and eventually will result in a new regulatory framework.
From a First Amendment perspective, however, courts will still face
the problem of setting the appropriate constitutional standard. If
judges proceed by trying to analyze whether digital broadband serv-
ices are more "like" telephone service or more "like" cable television
service, little will be gained by the reclassification.
4. Regulation and First Amendment Traditions
To begin construction of the electronic superhighway with the as-
sumption that access issues and content will be regulated in the same
way as previous "new" technologies begs an important question. Pro-
ponents of a regulatory approach assume that the justifications that
supported a different First Amendment standard for other media,
such as broadcasting, can be transplanted and applied to broadband
digital networks. Another possible assumption is that additional or
new justifications support a different constitutional approach, a ques-
tion that is explored in more detail in the next section of this Article.
Whatever theory may be used, it is vital to recognize that an impor-
tant choice is being made, and that fundamental differences exist be-
tween a First Amendment model based on press autonomy and one
based on regulation.
230. S. 1822, § 201B. This "public right-of-way" set-aside requirement would not apply
to cable operators or broadcasters already subject to similar requirements. See S. REP. No.
367 at 24.
231. H.R. 3636, § 206; S. 1822, §§ 102, 705.
232. S. 1822, § 640. The Senate report on the bill indicated congressional concern over
"an increasing number of published reports of inappropriate uses of telecommunications
technologies." Among other things, S. 1822 would have authorized cable operators to de-
lete programs or portions of programs on public or leased access channels that contained
"obscenity, indecency, or nudity." S. REP. No. 367 at 17.
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In comparing the competing visions of the First Amendment,
Dean Bollinger has noted how Supreme Court decisions with respect
to broadcasting amount to a "virtual celebration of public regula-
tion. '233 This, he concludes, is "[n]othing less . . .than a complete
conceptual reordering of the relationships between the government,
the press, and the public that was established with New York Times v.
Sullivan.' '234 To read cases like Red Lion Broadcasting is to "step into
another world," where the press itself represents the greatest threat to
First Amendment values, and government intervention in editorial
choices is the preferred method of salvation.235 It is a vision of the
First Amendment, in the words of William 0. Douglas, "that is agree-
able to the traditions of nations that have never known freedom of the
press. ,23
6
In this regard, it is essential to keep in mind the fact that conver-
gence of the media has significant implications far beyond its effect on
the integrity of existing regulatory classifications. Constitutional anal-
ysis of electronic media has been tied to the means of transmission.
Consequently, regulatory justifications for a lower level of constitu-
tional protection for one medium may well be communicable as tradi-
tional media move toward new means of delivery.
Former FCC Commissioner Lee Loevinger predicted that "the
computer and the electronic screen will become the printing presses of
the next century. ' 237 Perhaps this was a safe prediction, but it is well
233. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 71.
234. Id. at 66.
235. Id. at 72.
236. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring). See KATSH, supra note 74.
It may be ... that the greatest insight into what will occur over the next ten to
twenty years can be derived from looking back even further, at the period after
printing was introduced. This was the era when the modem struggle between
individual expression and state control over expression was forming. It may be
that more can be discerned about the future of free expression, about attempts by
government to control a new medium, and even about the likely direction of
Supreme Court decisions by looking at the spread of printing and by comparing
the qualities of print and the qualities of the new media, than by analyzing either
the trend of court decisions or the thoughts or intentions of the framers.
Id. at 138-39. See also Mario L. Baeza, Safeguarding the First Amendment in the Telecom-
munications Era, 97 HARV. L. REV. 584, 590 (1983) ("[T]oday we find ourselves at another
crossroads as we face a choice between increased freedom and increased repression of
speech."); David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Directions
in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201,212 (1979); Henry Goldberg &
Michael Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics": An Analysis of the First Amendment Implica-
tions of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 40-41 (1979).
237. Loevinger, supra note 77, at 776. See also POOL, supra note 59, at 224
("Networked computers will be the printing presses of the twenty-first century.").
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on its way to being fulfilled a decade early. Newspapers and
magazines across the country have embarked on a wide variety of
projects to create electronic publications.238 It is also significant that
traditional presses now use electronic production methods, including
computer terminals and local area networks to support writing, edit-
ing, and production as well as satellite links to transmit copy between
remote plants.239  As new technologies become the predominant
forms of communication and distribution of ideas, the overall level of
First Amendment protection in society may be diminished, even
among traditionally protected media.2"
This issue was squarely presented in Telecommunications Re-
search & Action Center v. FCC,241 (TRAC) in which the D.C. Circuit
held that broadcast content controls apply to teletext transmissions.
Teletext is a means of transmitting textual and graphic material to tel-
evision screens of home viewers, using an otherwise unused portion of
the broadcast signal.242 In its Report and Order authorizing teletext
service, the FCC declined to apply political broadcasting controls "pri-
marily [because of] a recognition that teletext's unique blending of the
print medium with radio technology fundamentally distinguishes it
from traditional broadcast programming. '243 The Court of Appeals
reversed the Commission's decision, focusing on the means of deliver-
ing the printed word. The Court reasoned that "[t]he dispositive fact
is that teletext is transmitted over broadcast frequencies that the
Supreme Court has ruled scarce and this makes teletext's content
regulable."' 244 "Teletext, whatever its similarities to the print media,
238. See, e.g., Telcos and Newspapers Fill in New Relationships, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, Feb. 17, 1994, at 2; Dierdre Carmody, The Media Business; Time's Readers to Talk
Back, on Computers, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at D6; John Markoff, A Media Pioneer's
Quest: Portable Electronic Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at Fll; David Shaw,
"Electronic" Newspaper Emerging After Slow Start, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1991, at Al; David
Shaw, Inventing the "Paper" of Future, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at Al. But see Paul Farhi,
Folding the Faxed Front Page, WASH. POST, July 26, 1994, at Dl; Jon Katz, Online or Not,
Newspapers Still Suck, WIRED, Sept. 1994, at 50.
239. Loevinger, supra note 77, at 776.
240. See Lively, supra note 85, at 1074.
241. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) [hereinafter TRAC].
242. Id. at 503. Teletext or videotext may also be transmitted by way of cable or tele-
phone, but the TRAC decision dealt only with over-the-air teletext transmissions.
243. Id. at 504 (citing In re Application of Certain Broadcast Stations Serving Commu-
nities in the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d 1294,
1324 (1983)).
244. Id. at 508.
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uses broadcast frequencies, and that, given Red Lion [Broadcasting],
would seem to be that.
245
TRAC suggests that newspapers delivered by electronic means
have less constitutional protection than those same stories written by
the same reporters and edited by the same editors when delivered on
paper. Consistent with this reasoning, one writer has advocated ap-
plying political broadcasting regulations to online computer services
such as Prodigy, CompuServe, and America Online.2 46 To avoid the
risk that online services might discriminate between candidates, Con-
gress could require such services to provide "reasonable access" to
candidates, "equal time" in the event an opponent uses the service,
and limit prices to the "lowest unit charge." This could be accom-
plished constitutionally, according to the article, by assuming that
broadcasting provides the appropriate regulatory and constitutional
metaphor.247
Such a theoretical approach poses an interesting logical question.
If traditional media are properly subject to a different constitutional
standard when the link between the publisher and the reader is elec-
tronic, what is the appropriate standard when the electronic link is
between the writer and the publisher? In other words, so long as elec-
tronic methods are used at some stage in the production process,
would not the government have jurisdiction to regulate the content of
the publication, just as with broadcasting?
In a 1987 Senate hearing on the fairness doctrine, Professor Rob-
ert Shayon of the Annenberg School of Communications appeared to
suggest that any use of spectrum in the production process would jus-
tify content regulation of the press. Shayon asserted that content con-
trols might constitutionally be imposed on the New York Times or the
Wall Street Journal because they transmit their copy via satellite to
printing plants across the country. "I think that the spectrum is lim-
ited," Shayon observed, "and if the big users shut out the small users,
then the government should act to make fairness the ruling guide-
245. Id. at 508-09. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the FCC could refrain from en-
forcing the fairness doctrine for teletext transmissions since the doctrine was an FCC policy
and not a statutory requirement. Id. at 516-18.
246. Angela J. Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Information Age: A Proposal
for Protecting Political Candidates' Use of On-Line Computer Services, 38 VILL. L. REV.
517 (1993).
247. Id. at 518-19 & n.9, 542-45; id. at 521. "The assimilation of computer-based com-
munications is remarkably similar to the process by which radio became an accepted me-
dium of communication." Id. See also COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, SERVING THE COMMUNITY: A PUBLIC INTEREST VISION OF THE NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 22-23 (1993) (advocating government policies to
promote diversity in content markets).
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line.... The government is not only a repressive factor, it represents
the total community and sometimes can be used constructively." 24, In
other words, based on the choice of distribution media, the "total
community" may gain the ability to tell the New York Times and the
Wall Street Journal what is "fair" and to enforce any such determina-
tion. Former FCC Chairman Charles Ferris, a staunch supporter of
the fairness doctrine, has raised a similar question.249
In short, the choice of a First Amendment standard for cable tele-
vision or for other communications networks is not a simple decision
that will determine how a particular new technology will be regulated
in isolation. Because the media are converging, the constitutional ap-
proach selected now could well determine the nature of the First
Amendment applicable to all media in the twenty-first century. The
choice might represent a fundamental shift in the relationship be-
tween the government and the press. Some would regard such a
change as a welcome event because it would allow far greater flexibil-
ity in the realm of public policy. Others view it as a threat that would
undermine the central purpose of the First Amendment-to free the
press from government oversight. The next section addresses the rela-
tive merits of the competing views.
A Traditionalist Approach to the First Amendment
"What kind of First Amendment would best serve our needs as
we approach the 21st century may be an open question. '250 Most the-
orists agree that some new analytical approach is needed to cope with
changes in the media marketplace and to replace judicial doctrines
that have increasingly obvious deficiencies. But there is little agree-
ment about what that approach should be. The debate on this issue in
the courts typically has pitted advocates from each side of the dispute
proposing competing analogies for how the technology at issue should
be treated: whether it should be analyzed under a "print model" or a
"broadcast model" of the First Amendment. However, these points
are simply specific questions that are part of a larger debate. The cen-
tral issue revolves around the appropriate relationship between the
government and the press.
248. CONO. REC. S8438 (daily ed. June 23, 1987) (statement of Professor Shayon). See
Licensing Broadcasters: Just What the Framers Feared?, CATO POLICY REPORT 6, 8-9 (Jan./
Feb. 1988).
249. POOL, supra note 59, at 1.




The principal arguments in this debate fall into three categories:
1) the First Amendment is best served by allowing regulation of new
media as constitutional protections slowly evolve, an approach I have
labelled "incrementalism;" 2) government intervention is necessary to
promote First Amendment "values," an approach I refer to as "revi-
sionism;" and 3) the First Amendment requires a separation between
press and state, an approach I describe as "traditionalism." This sec-
tion describes these three approaches and evaluates the likelihood
that a given theory can resolve the issues currently creating First
Amendment strains.251 The Article concludes that traditionalism is
most likely to provide lasting First Amendment protection for the
media.
A. Alternative Visions of the First Amendment
1. Incrementalist Perspective
One prominent theory holds that the First Amendment is
strengthened by the gradual approach taken by the courts in which
"full" constitutional rights are initially denied to new technologies. In
an influential article, Dean Lee Bollinger argues that a system of "par-
tial regulation," in which traditional speakers are fully protected and
new technologies are subject to a lesser standard, may best serve con-
stitutional purposes.252 Bollinger's thesis is essentially a compromise
between proponents of "absolute" constitutional protection (to the
extent any such thing exists) for all media and advocates of a "new"
First Amendment that would accord government more expansive
power over the press. At opposite ends of this spectrum stand Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,253 in which the Supreme Court de-
nied a right of access to newspapers, and Red Lion Broadcasting, Co.
v. FCC,254 in which it upheld a limited right of access to broadcast
stations via the fairness doctrine. Bollinger reasons that "the Court
reached the correct result in both cases. '255 It is an argument that,
251. This is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of all existing First Amendment
theories. Rather, it identifies the broad issues raised regarding new technologies and the
First Amendment and predicts which approach seems most likely to serve the interest in
free expression.
252. Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1976). See also BOLLINGER,
supra note 165, at 133-51. Professor Powe noted that Bollinger's theory "swept the legal
academy" and became "the standard citation in any discussion of the topic." PowE, supra
note 38, at 5.
253. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
254. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
255. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 109.
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from a constitutional perspective, we are living in the best of all possi-
ble worlds.256
Bollinger accepts the arguments on both sides of the First
Amendment debate. He agrees that the usual justifications for treat-
ing new technologies differently from traditional speakers are "weak
and illogical," "embarrassing," or even "simple-minded." 7 Despite
these deficiencies, he suggests that there is a strong perception that
there are differences between the media and that this belief may jus-
tify a variable constitutional approach.25 Bollinger acknowledges the
risk of entangling the government with the press and cites the usual
examples indicating how the regulatory system has been abused to
serve political ends.259 At the same time, he suggests that there is a
''general view" that the FCC has been "extraordinarily circumspect"
in its use of power over the broadcast press. 260 On the other side of
the debate, while Bollinger notes the dangers inherent in mandating
access to the mass media, he concludes that such regulation "both re-
sponds to constitutional traditions and cuts against them."26' Accord-
ingly, he would permit the government to require public access
"somewhere within the mass media but not throughout the press. "262
There are several advantages to this approach according to Bol-
linger. First, it ensures public access based on the understanding that
democratic debate "is too critical a matter" to leave in the hands of a
few.263 At the same time, by focusing such requirements only on cer-
tain media, the system of partial regulation allows experimentation
with public policy while at the same time preserving an "unregulated
sector" to act as a check upon government.26 The system should
yield a net gain in the amount of speech and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, encourage print journalists to live up to the principle of fairness
256. Id. at 110. "[Tlhere is nothing in the First Amendment that forbids having the best
of both worlds." Id.
257. Id. at 89, 90, 93.
258. Id. at 90-99.
259. Id. at 111-13.
260. Id. at 97, 115. "The Commission has, on the whole, been extraordinarily circum-
spect in the exercise of its powers." Id. at 33. The one exception to this restraint, in Bollin-
ger's view, is its enforcement of rules regulating broadcast indecency. Id. at 33-34 n.103.
"The only area, it seems, where the commission can perhaps be charged with having seri-
ously ignored important free speech interests is that of indecent speech." Id. at 197 n.21.
261. Id. at 111-12.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 117.
264. Id. at 114-15.
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embodied in the regulatory model while stimulating the broadcast
press to emulate their autonomous brethren.265
This very brief description of the partial regulation theory does
not attempt to fully explain the many nuances contained in Bollinger's
argument. It merely seeks to identify the balance struck between the
First Amendment rights of the autonomous media and the First
Amendment "interests" that represent the aspirations of public regu-
lation. The theory recognizes the inherent risk to free expression
presented by government regulation but concludes that the "unregu-
lated sectors" will prevent any long term damage to the First Amend-
ment. Such unabashed defenses of the status quo are rare among First
Amendment theorists, but they do appear from time to time. Consis-
tent with this view, Professor Frederick Schauer has written that "the
history of first amendment doctrine provides considerable cause for
optimism." He added that "[w]hile the reactions have not been as fast
as many would like ... the courts have in the past demonstrated the
ability to adapt [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine to new forms of
technology." 266
2. Revisionist Perspective
Unlike the measured approach of the incrementalists, adherents
of revisionism argue that the common understanding of the First
Amendment as a barrier against government action is obsolete. In
this view, the changing nature of American society, including the
growth of large corporations and the reduction of the state as a re-
pressive force, suggests that government should take an active role in
promoting First Amendment values. Contrary to traditional interpre-
tations, an unregulated press, not government involvement, poses the
greatest threat to free expression. As a result, the government must
act to ensure that First Amendment values are preserved. The revi-
sionist approach requires a radical shift in perspective from the free
speech concepts articulated in such cases as New York Times v. Sulli-
van267 or Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.2 68
265. "[T]he juxtaposition of the autonomous print media, represent[s] continued re-
spect for the ideal of a free press, against the regulated broadcast media." Id. at 115.
"[Tlhe value of mixed [regulatory] systems [is] in yielding the most information." Id. at
118. "[O]ne of the advantages of public regulation is that it is a way to instruct other
branches of the media (i.e., print) in proper journalistic standards." Id. at 119.
266. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Demise of the Soapbox, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 558, 572 (1984). See also Baeza, supra note 236, at 594.
267. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
268. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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Justice William 0. Douglas has written that a shift to this perspec-
tive would require the adoption of "a new First Amendment.
269
Some revisionists whole-heartedly agree. Professor Cass Sunstein, for
example, has written that his theory (a "New Deal" for speech)
"would produce significant changes in our understanding of the free
speech guarantee. It would call for a large-scale revision in the view
about when a law 'abridges' the freedom of speech."27 In particular,
he suggests that press autonomy "may itself be an abridgement of the
free speech right," but he acknowledges that to reach this conclusion,
"it will be necessary to abandon or at least to qualify the basic princi-
ples that have dominated judicial, academic, and popular thinking
about speech in the last generation."
271
This radical difference in perspective, which Bollinger has charac-
terized as coming from "another world," demonstrates that the revi-
sionist perspective is not concerned with technology per se.272 Rather,
its focus is on the achievement of First Amendment "goals" or "val-
ues," however they might be defined, and on the need to allow gov-
ernment broad latitude in bringing them about. Technology does play
a role, however, in that judicial decisions regarding new media are
viewed as reinforcing revisionist theory. For example, Dean Jerome
Barron, who has been described as "the intellectual godfather of com-
pulsory access to the press, 273 wrote that Red Lion Broadcasting
''represents a look at the First Amendment in the light of new social
realities of concentration of ownership and control in a few hands that
has been produced by the twin developments of media oligopoly and
technological change. 274 Similarly, concerns regarding private abuses
by broadcasters or other new media practitioners are used to bolster
arguments in favor of government intervention.275
269. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 161 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring). See also Lucas A. Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 243.
270. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH XiX (1993)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY]. It is interesting to note, however, that Sunstein de-
nied any intent "to ignore the First Amendment or to call for a new constitutional amend-
ment." Id. at xvi. Rather, he describes current First Amendment concerns as "strange,"
and labels present trends as "The New First Amendment." Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 255, 257-58 (1992).
271. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 270, at xix, xx.
272. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 72. See also POWE, supra note 38, at 252 (the con-
cept that modern media present serious threats to democracy "jumps off the page").
273. Lucas A. Powe, Tornillo, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 345.
274. Jerome A. Barron, Access the Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766,
771 (1970).
275. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-88 (1969).
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A primary concern of revisionism, then, is to preserve freedom to
make public policy.27 6 Like law and order advocates who complain
that constitutional safeguards are mere "technicalities" that protect
the guilty, some revisionists argue that the First Amendment is be-
coming an impediment to developing necessary communications poli-
cies. Dean Monroe Price of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
has written that judicial decisions on the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters, cable operators, and telephone companies "can throw
complex federal compromises . . . into a cocked hat" and make
"[l]awyers, not economists or political scientists," the arbiters of "what
is possible, what the competing values are, how they should be mea-
sured, how they should be weighed and validated." The proper role
for the First Amendment in this debate, according to Price, is "in the
background, informing, but not controlling the debate.
'2 77
A necessary corollary to this view is that the government no
longer presents a significant threat to freedom of expression. Or, at
least, comparing the relative threats posed by government and big
business, revisionists would prefer to take their chances with the gov-
ernment. For some, this is a simple choice. As stated in one article,
current First Amendment theory is based on "eighteenth century fears
of government's tyrannical censorship." Current First Amendment
theory is skewed, in this view, because "the evils against which that
law was directed no longer prevail." But in the new cultural environ-
ment, a more serious threat is presented by the "consumptive thrust of
unchecked capitalism [which] affects all public discourse. '278 In this
scenario, "we cannot retain our old constitutional prerogatives."279
276. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1074 (1994):
However, a number of First Amendment policy considerations that underlie the
technology-based rationale of frequency scarcity remain worthy of attention re-
gardless of technological changes. As the courts face new communication tech-
nologies, the focus ought to be on the extent, if any, to which these underlying
First Amendment policies justify regulation.
Id.
277. Monroe E. Price, Congress, Free Speech, and Cable Legislation: An Introduction, 8
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. at 228, 230 (1989). "Structural policies advocated by first
amendment zealots may be the best ones for the society. But they should be justified for
their overall value to the community, not insisted upon only as required by the constitu-
tion." Id. ut 231. "[T]he First Amendment should not operate as a talismanic or reflexive
obstacle to our efforts to experiment with different strategies for achieving free speech
goals." SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 270, at 81. See also Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, supra note 270, at 257-58.
278. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Para-
troopers, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1087, 1088, 1107 (1990).
279. Id. at 1088.
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Or, as put more mildly by Professor Sunstein, "[w]e should not be so
reflexively opposed to 'government regulation.""'2 °
Although there are variations, and some purposes overlap, revi-
sionist theory generally seeks government intervention in the service
of three policy goals: public access to the mass media; preserving the
relative power of various speakers by reducing excessive concentra-
tions of power; and improving the quality of public discourse. Each of
these goals can be characterized as serving an overriding purpose of
promoting democracy. And, to a certain extent, each may reinforce
the other. Access requirements, for example, may tend to reduce the
effects of concentration of power by giving voice to the powerless;
ownership limits are another way to attack concentration, and in do-
ing so, may increase public access by extending the franchise across a
broader range of the public. Both of these goals seek to improve the
quality of public discourse by encouraging more speech from diverse
and antagonistic sources. The "quality" goal is more problematic, and
often is served by proposals to delete certain objectionable ideas from
the marketplace of ideas. However, there have been attempts to com-
pel the media to improve their product, such as the affirmative fair-
ness doctrine requirement that broadcasters air controversial issues of
public importance, and requirements that broadcasters transmit a cer-
tain amount of children's television programming while reducing
commercialism.28'
The most common revisionist theme involves requiring mass me-
dia to provide some type of public access. Such access rights may take
various forms, including responsive access, selective access, and uni-
versal access to the media. The fairness doctrine and personal attack
rules, right of reply statutes, and "equal opportunities" requirements
in political broadcasting law are examples of "responsive access"
rights.282 "Selective, access" regulations include cable franchise re-
quirements for PEG channels,283 must-carry rules,28 the noncommer-
cial/educational channel set-aside for DBS28 5 and "reasonable access
280. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 270, at 34.
281. 47 U.S.C. § 303a-b (Supp. IV 1992); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 385 (1969).
282. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1973);
Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 385.
283. 47 U.S.C. § 531(c).
284. Id. §§ 534-535 (Supp. IV 1992). See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.
Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
285. The 1992 Cable Act requires operators of DBS service to set aside four to seven
percent of their channel capacity for "noncommercial programming of an educational na-
ture." 47 U.S.C. § 335. However, this requirement is one of three provisions of the 1992
1994]
requirements" for federal candidates on broadcasting stations.286
"Universal access" is based on the common carrier model, whereby
the owner of a distribution medium is legally obligated to serve all
customers without discrimination. Proposals to extend common car-
rier requirements generally focus on cable television, such as with
"leased access" requirements, 287 or on broadband communications
networks.288 Some revisionists, however, would enforce common car-
rier requirements on print publishers.289
Jerome Barron probably is the most influential of revisionist the-
orists. His article, Access to the Press a New First Amendment Right,
became the intellectual model for successive theories supporting pub-
lic access to the media.29° His central thesis is that constitutional the-
ory is corrupted by the "romantic conception" that the marketplace of
ideas is freely accessible, and he concludes that legal intervention is
needed "if novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum."29'
Barron wrote that "when the soap box yields to radio [or television]
and the political pamphlet to the monopoly newspaper," the First
Amendment problem becomes the accumulation of private power, for
which a public remedy is necessary.2 2 Although he was concerned
with all media, including newspapers, Barron emphasized that
problems of attaining access have been increased by new mass media
technologies.293
Cable Act that the U.S. District Court for D.C. held is "clearly unconstitutional." Daniels
Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8 (1993). The court said that "[i]n the
absence of a record identifying a valid regulatory purpose or some other legitimate govern-
ment interest to be advanced by conscripting DBS channel space, there is no justification
for any First Amendment burdens occasioned by section 25." Id. at 8-9. The same court
found the public and leased access provisions to.be constitutional. Id. at 6. "Enabling a
broad range of speakers to reach a television audience that otherwise would never hear
them is an appropriate goal and a legitimate exercise of federal legislative power." 'Id.
286. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
287. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a).
288. See generally S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). See also GELLER, supra note 165; Allen S. Hammond IV, Regulating Broadband
Communication Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1992).
289. See, e.g., Mark S. Nadel, A Technology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment
and Access to Communications Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157 (1991); Nadel, supra note
59.
290. See generally Dominic Caristi, The Concept of a Right to Access to the Media: A
Workable Alternative, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 103 (1988); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CH L. REV. 20 (1975).
291. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press a New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
292. Id. at 1643.
293. Id. at 1644.
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Barron's access theory appeared to be vindicated when the
Supreme Court decided Red Lion Broadcasting, upholding the FCC's
personal attack rule and fairness doctrine. The Court described the
special circumstances that distinguish broadcasting from print media
and noted that the First Amendment "does not embrace a right to
snuff out the free speech of others."2 94 Justice White's opinion for the
Court stated that it is the right "of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount," and that "there is no
sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship
operating in a medium not open to all." '295 The broad promise in the
dictum of Red Lion Broadcasting was cut short four years later when
the Supreme Court decided that broadcasters may refuse to sell time
to private entities wishing to sell editorial advertisements.296
The following year, the Court struck an even more stunning blow
to the theory in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,29 7 holding
that a state right of reply statute for newspapers was unconstitutional.
Barron was the losing counsel, and the Court spoke directly to his
access theory: "However much validity may be found in these argu-
ments," creating an enforceable right of access "at once brings about a
confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment.
'298
The Court concluded that a "[g]overnment enforced right of access
inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate.'
, 29 9
Despite these setbacks, the access movement has found expres-
sion both in theory and in federal policy for the electronic media. In
one proposal, every commercial radio and television station in the
United States would be required to set aside one hour of prime time
programming each day for broadcasts by an "Audience Network."
The Audience Network would be a national non-profit membership
organization established by statute. It's objective would be "to put
daily, civic function behind the principle that information is the cur-
rency of democracy." 0 Another theory would subject all media that
294. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969).
295. Id. at 390, 392.
296. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). "Only when the
interests of the public are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broad-
casters will government power be asserted within the framework of the Act." Id.
297. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
298. Id. at 254.
299. Id. at 255 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
300. Ralph Nader & Clarie Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the
Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 4, 86 (1988).
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the government deems to be economically "scarce" to common carrier
requirements.3 °'
Recent attention devoted to the creation of an electronic super-
highway has moved the focus of the access discussion to its application
to broadband communication networks. For example, the Clinton
Administration's NII proposal and infrastructure legislation intro-
duced in the 103d Congress were predicated on a policy of "universal
access," both for programmers and for end customers.30 2 Similarly, S.
1822's proposal for a "public right-of-way" was grounded in access
concepts, as was the provision of H.R. 3636 to permit the FCC to im-
pose common carrier requirements on cable operators that con-
structed broadband networks.30 3 In a thoughtful analysis, Professor
Allen Hammond advocates applying a Variation of the public/private
forum doctrine to broadband networks.3 4 His model is an attempt to
"move beyond the regulatory morass which could result from an at-
tempt to regulate the new communications media under the old regu-
latory schemes. ' 30 5 At the same time, it seeks to avoid "the specter of
censorship" both by the government and by private entities.30 6
Under this theory, public fora would consist of transmission prov-
iders possessing monopoly power or essential facilities, or entities that
elect public forum status. Their ability to exclude access to their facili-
ties would be sharply limited, in the same way that the government
may not restrict access to streets, parks, sidewalks and other tradi-
tional public fora. Nor would public fora networks be able to control
the content of communications on their networks.30 7 Private fora
would also exist, providing service to "distinct, specialized users.
3 8
There would not be the same right of access to private fora, except to
the extent they interconnect with public fora facilities. To reduce the
danger of censorship, government determinations regarding access
and speech entitlement would be limited to "relatively objective, non-
content oriented, evidentiary considerations of whether a firm pos-
sesses monopoly power or essential facilities.
3 9
301. Nadel, supra note 59, at 190-94.
302. See supra note 219.
303. See Hammond supra note 288.
304. Id. at 222-35.
305. Id. at 225.
306. Id. at 227.
307. Id. at 223-35. The model proposes that "public fora exchange their access and
content controls for substantially limited business and speech liability." Id. at 225.
308. Id. at 222.
309. Id. at 225.
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Henry Geller has proposed a similar approach. Like Hammond,
he concludes that "our present regulatory models for electronic media
have failed."31  However, a fiber optics network holds "great promise
for video publishing over a common carrier (telco) distribution sys-
tem," representing "an opportunity for a successful media regulatory
policy."31' Geller would eliminate the "public trustee" concept that
has been applied to broadcasting, replacing it with a system of subsi-
dies for public interest programming, funded by a combination of
spectrum and cable franchise fees.312 The broadband network would
be operated as a common carrier, thus ensuring nondiscriminatory ac-
cess and an absence of content control by the carrier.1 3 At the same
time, however, for both economic and First Amendment reasons, the
Geller model would permit common carriers to control the content on
a limited number ("perhaps as many as five") of the channels on its
network. This content restriction would be removed once competitive
alternatives developed.31 4
Other revisionist theories are concerned with the content of com-
munications. In The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers,
Ronald Collins and David Skover argue that the "business of televi-
sion" undermines democracy. They assert that "[w]ith entertainment
as the paradigm for most public discourse, traditional first-amendment
values which stress civic restraint and serious dialogue are overshad-
owed. ' 315 Collins and Skover assert that the nature of television, with
its focus on image and absence of context, "allows people to experi-
ence more and understand less. ' 316 Because television "appeals more
to the senses than to the intellect,"3 7 and is tainted by commercialism,
it "inhibits the important first-amendment value of diversity of subject
and opinion. "318
310. GELLER, supra note 165, at 25.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 15. Based on his long experience with the FCC, Geller concluded that "the
public trustee scheme itself behavioral regulation to ensure that the broadcaster acts as a
fiduciary for its community is a joke." Id.
313. Id. at 6-7, 12.
314. Id. at 36. Common carriers, however, would not be permitted to acquire cable
television systems.
315. Collins & Skover, supra note 278, at 1088 (footnote omitted).
316. Id. at 1096 (quoting Yaukey, Newsman Shorr Blasts Politics Warped by TV., ImH-
ACA J., Nov. 15, 1988, at 3A, col. 1).
317. Id. Cf Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 659 (1992) (overturning district court ruling that 2 Live Crew album is obscene
because it appeals to "the loins, not to the intellect and the mind"). See Skywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
318. Collins & Skover, supra note 278, at 1098-99.
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But while they reject traditional First Amendment approaches,
particularly as they apply to new technologies, Collins and Skover also
reject most revisionist solutions. Thus, they applaud efforts to "wres-
tle prime time from the commercial 'haves,' and to place it in the
hands of the public 'have nots,"' but ask, "once the reformists have
created their Audience Network to caution the public to the dangers
of commercial broadcasting, the question will be: Who wants to watch
it?" 31 9-a good question, really. In any event, the authors put off of-
fering a solution for another time, and conclude that their analysis
presents a paradox: "The first amendment cannot save itself without
destroying itself."32
Sunstein agrees with many of the symptoms identified by Collins
and Skover, but more constructively offers some proposed solutions.
Calling his approach a "New Deal for speech," Sunstein argues that
"government controls on the broadcast media, designed to ensure di-
versity of view and attention to public affairs, would help the system
of free expression. '32 1 Such controls would include public interest re-
quirements for television, rights of reply, children's advertising limits
and restrictions on advertiser control over programming content.322
Unlike Barron, Sunstein is concerned with broader problems than
monopolization of the media. Accordingly, he proposes measures
that would force people to pay attention to serious public affairs pro-
gramming.323 Apart from evoking images from A Clockwork Orange,
the mechanism for implementing such a requirement is not made
clear. On the other hand, Sunstein advocates a more active role for
the FCC in promoting programming quality, such as issuing non-bind-
ing guidelines, recommending to candidates that they "deliver sub-
319. Id. at 1122. See id. at 1116-24.
320. Id. at 1116. The authors promise to provide more insights in a forthcoming work
entitled The Death of Discourse.
321. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 270, at xix, 16. He also advocates increased
government power to regulate commercial speech, libel, scientific speech with potential
military applications, speech that invades privacy, hate speech, certain forms of pornogra-
phy and disclosure of rape victims' names. Id. at xviii. Such an ambitious reworking of the
First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.
322. Id. at 35. Sunstein would not limit his regulations to television. He suggests, for
example, that a fairness doctrine or other content controls could be applied to the print
media. Id. at 108-14 ("narrow regulatory initiatives including controls on advertisers and
right to reply laws might well be upheld as applied to newspapers").
323. Id. at 73. Sunstein is understandably cautious about this approach and suggests
that "a requirement of media attention to public affairs" might appropriately be adopted
by the people "acting through their elected representatives." But he adds that if people's
current television viewing patterns conflict with a more active promotion of public affairs,
then "the democratic judgments should prevail, so long as they do not intrude on anything
that is properly characterized as a right." Id.
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stantial speeches on national and local television" and participate in
"a set number of debates," and offering the networks an antitrust ex-
emption as a means of reducing violent programming.
324
An undercurrent of much revisionist writing is a McLuhanesque
notion that the medium of television has unique characteristics, such
as its power or its reach, that call for greater government control. The
"pervasive presence" idea, embraced by a plurality in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,325 represents one aspect of this view. Another is the idea
that the video medium itself may be entitled to less constitutional pro-
tection because of its subliminal influence. While this view has not
been widely accepted by the courts, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Banzhaf v. FCC:3 26
[T]he broadcasting medium may be different in kind from publish-
ing in a way which has particular relevance to the case at hand.
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in con-
trast, are 'in the air.' In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely
breathes a citizen who does not know some part of a leading ciga-
rette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television
watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the
room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative
act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive
propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may
reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written
word.327
The role that such attitudes toward video programming play in
defining the medium's First Amendment status is not entirely clear.
However, former FCC Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson believed that
the "unarticulated assumption" of most arguments supporting greater
control over broadcasting was the belief that broadcasting is a
"uniquely influential and powerful.., medium of communication. '328
This factor most likely will remain a tacit part of any debate over
whether a new First Amendment should apply to the electronic
media.
324. Id. at 82-83.
325. 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 127-28 (1973) (captive audience theory weighs against rule requiring broadcasters to
carry editorial advertising). But it is difficult to say how much more "captive" the broad-
cast audience is compared to those who view other video services.
326. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
327. Id. at 1100-01.
328. Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years




Traditionalists believe that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution is predicated on protecting new communications
technologies. By incorporating the Free Press Clause as a structural
provision of the Constitution,329 traditionalists claim that the Framers
consciously extended protection to the only organized mass medium
of their age. Justice Potter Stewart has written that the First Amend-
ment protects an "institution," and that the publishing industry is "the
only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional
protection. '331 It is possible to argue that the Framers intended to
extend freedom of expression only to technologies of which they were
aware. Yet, even proponents of the so-called doctrine of "original in-
tent" have urged that courts "must never hesitate to apply old values
to new circumstances, [such as when] those circumstances are changes
in technology."' 331 Thus, although "[t]he first amendment's guarantee
of freedom of the press was written by men who had not the remotest
idea of modern forms of communication," it is nevertheless impera-
tive that judges adapt the doctrine of the first amendment "to encom-
pass the electronic media.
332
Over a decade ago, Ithiel de Sola Pool examined the historical
development of communications technologies and their relation to
freedom of expression. He concluded that the First Amendment "ap-
plies fully to all media ... not just to the media that existed in the
eighteenth century. '3 33 Instead of focusing on the means of transmis-
sion, constitutional protection should center on "the function of com-
munication. ' 334 Additionally, publication even on electronic media
should be unlicensed by the government and free from prior re-
straint.335 Finally, presumption would disfavor regulation unless the
government could demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly
drawn to serve a significant end.336 Pool's theory contained one signif-
329. Id.
330. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975). While it is true
that the Supreme Court has refused to create special First Amendment rights for the press,
the point here is that the First Amendment specifically recognized the institution of the
press. But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990).
"[C]ompelling reason[s]" support placing fewer restrictions on a media corporation be-
cause such entities fulfill a "crucial societal role." Id.
331. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985) (Bork, J., concurring).
332. Id.
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icant caveat: common carrier regulation, rather than direct regula-
tion, should be used where "resources for communication are truly
monopolistic. "337
Although Pool was not the first to suggest that electronic media
fit within traditional First Amendment protections, his work was very
influential. A growing number of scholars and public officials began
to call for an end to the regulatory cycles that subjected new technolo-
gies to lower levels of constitutional protection.338 Professor Powe ex-
amined the history of FCC regulation of broadcasting and described a
wide variety of political abuses.339 He concluded that the "lessons of
licensing, whether in seventeenth-century England or twentieth-cen-
tury America" should cause courts and policymakers to look away
from government, not to it, for solutions to the problems of new tech-
nologies.31 Jonathan Emord proposed a "[p]reservationist
[p]erspective" on the First Amendment following a comprehensive ex-
amination of constitutional and regulatory history.34' Under this the-
ory, courts should interpret the First Amendment so as to impose
"[s]tatic [b]arriers" against government intervention but to allow
"[a]daptive [d]efinitions" of the terms speech and press to account for
new technologies.342
337. Id. However, Pool noted that "the communications monopolies that exist without
privileged enforcement by the state are rare." Id. at 247. While he maintained that entities
and particularly publishers should not be made common carriers involuntarily, carriage
obligations were reasonable for government-created monopolies. Id. In that instance, sev-
eral other requirements would be allowed, including mandatory interconnections, disclo-
sure of accounting methods and a time limit on the monopoly franchise. Id. at 247-48. As
to content control, Pool argued that both the government and the carrier "should be blind
to circuit use." Id. at 248.
338. E.g., David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Direc-
tions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201 (1979); Ronald H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Mark S. Fowler &
Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207
(1982); Henry Goldberg & Michael Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics": An Analysis of the
First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1978);
Robinson, supra, note 328.
339. POWE, supra note 38.
340. Id. at 256. Another comprehensive analysis of broadcast regulation is found in
MATrHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING
THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 46-47, 50 (1986) [hereinafter SPITZER, SEVEN
DIRTY WORDS]. Revisionist accounts of the history of broadcast regulation, which con-
clude that political factors rather than spectrum scarcity explain the move toward regula-
tion, appear in EMORD, supra note 38, at 137-165; Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of
U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Matthew L.
Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1043-48
(1989).
341. EMORD, supra note 38.
342. Id. at 128-29. See also Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of
FCC Content Regulations, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 93, 206-11 (1992);
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Professor Laurence Tribe has proposed a new constitutional
amendment designed to preserve traditional constitutional rights for
new communications technologies. It would provide:
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press,
petition, and assembly, and its protections against. unreasonable
searches and seizures and the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, shall be construed as fully applicable
without regard to the technological method or medium through
which information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted,
or controlled.343
The point Tribe made by offering an amendment was to underscore
the importance of the issues, not to suggest that the First Amendment
as drafted was somehow inadequate. 3" Rather, he described the Con-
stitution as "an astonishing document" applicable to "all times and
technological landscapes. '345 He disputed the assumption underlying
revisionist theory that the First Amendment should be employed to
prevent "private censorship. 3 a46 Regardless of the technology, the
point of the First Amendment is "restraining government above all
else" and "protecting all private groups from government.
'347
So much for theory. How would traditional First Amendment
principles be applied to new technologies in practice? The following
paragraphs suggest some analytic approaches to this question, based
on previous cases using established First Amendment principles.
Some of the points seem almost too obvious to mention, but they
often are overlooked in cases involving new communications media.
First, it is important to acknowledge that the various media may
in fact have different physical characteristics. These characteristics
may be relevant to the government's regulatory interest. For exam-
ple, amplified sound can cause excessive noise and may be regulated
accordingly, 348 whereas print provides no similar basis for government
intervention. Printed matter, on the other hand, unlike aural commu-
nications, may cause litter or be distributed via physical means such as
newsboxes that may be regulated.349 Face-to-face communications,
Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1989).
343. Tribe, supra note 84.
344. He suggested that the Amendment could ensure protections for technology that
the Ninth Amendment was intended to do for the Constitution's text. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. Like Pool, Tribe suggested that the government might require some form of
access to technologies that become "socially indispensable." Id.
347. Id. (emphasis in original).
348. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949).
349. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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compared to the other methods of spreading ideas, can tie up traffic or
cause other problems that require some type of control.350 These con-
siderations may result in a somewhat different First Amendment anal-
ysis for each medium of communication, but they do not require
different First Amendment standards.
Second, the analysis must compare the characteristic of the regu-
lated medium with the government's regulatory justification to deter-
mine if the two are sufficiently related. The basic approach is set out
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,35' in which the Supreme
Court struck down a state condition on the issuance of a building per-
mit. Although the state had the authority to issue or deny the permit,
it could not condition its decision on a concession by the applicant
that was unrelated to the government's interest.352 To illustrate the
point, Justice Scalia wrote that while the state could forbid "shouting
fire in a crowded theater," it could not "grant dispensations to those
willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. '35 In other words,
there must be an "essential nexus" between the.government's use of
its authority and the problem to be solved.
354
Third, the importance of the "nexus" analysis suggests that there
should be a close fit between ends sought and means chosen when the
government seeks to regulate speech because of some special charac-
teristic. In this regard, the generic test of United States v. O'Brien355 is
inappropriate to gauge the congruence between means and ends. As
explained in more detail below, O'Brien is a symbolic speech case that
has been extended incorrectly far beyond its original context.356 The
350. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988).
351. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nollan raised the question of whether local land use regula-
tion constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). But the constitutional analysis requiring an essential "fit"
between the government interest and the proposed regulation is directly applicable to com-
munications policy and the First Amendment. See S. REP. No. 367, supra note 227, at 43-
47.
352. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
353. Id. at 837.
354. Id.
355. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
356. Using the O'Brien test in cases involving direct regulation of the media (as op-
posed to general business regulations applicable to all) commits the fallacy described
above that calls First Amendment rights for cable operators "the right to string wires on
poles." Certainly government may regulate paper production, but when the commodity is
used by a publisher to produce a newspaper, regulation has First Amendment conse-
quences. The district court opinion in Turner Broadcasting is based on this fallacy, claim-
ing that the government was merely regulating "the means of delivery of video signals to
individual receivers." 819 F. Supp. 32, 40 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994). The court was unconcerned by the fact that
1994]
inadequacy of O'Brien, as well as the meaning of this third analytic
step, is best understood by examining First Amendment cases involv-
ing less-protected speech.
Like the electronic media, certain types of speech, such as com-
mercial speech and fighting words, have received a lower level of con-
stitutional protection.357 But while such speech may be subjected to
more regulation, the government may not do so without matching the
rule with the characteristic that permits greater government involve-
ment.358 Thus, recent decisions establishing limits for the regulation
of "low value" speech are particularly relevant.
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 3 5 9 the Supreme
Court invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the distribution of
commercial handbills via newsracks on the city's rights of way. The
city had justified its regulation by pointing to its valid regulatory inter-
est in promoting safety and aesthetics on the streets and on the fact
that the newsracks at issue were used to disseminate commercial
speech. It argued that it could promote this interest one step at a time
without violating the First Amendment. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. It found that the city's emphasis on the nature of the publica-
tion to be regulated illustrated the difficulty of treating commercial
speech as a distinct category.36° The Court concluded that without
"some basis for distinguishing between 'newspapers' and 'commercial
handbills' that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city," it would
not uphold a ban on newsracks for handbills simply because commer-
cial speech can be regulated more extensively. 361 In other words,
there must be an "essential nexus" between the characteristic of the
medium that permits government action and the specific rule in ques-
tion. Moreover, there must be a reasonable fit between the govern-
"video signals have no other function than to convey information." Id. But see Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1994) ("without
the signals transmitted along the wires, cable is basically like any other utility" and "all
regulations even those which relate only to the construction of the plant are subjected to
demanding First Amendment scrutiny because of their direct impact on programming").
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting held the government to a more
rigorous standard of proof, noting that "[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on
speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more
than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."' Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470 (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
357. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
358. Id.
359. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
360. Id. at 1511.
361. Id. at 1516 (emphasis added).
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ment's purpose and the means chosen to advance it.3 62 Thus, the
Court found that the regulatory interest did not match the solution,
and therefore did not justify restricting the distribution technology.363
The Court employed a similar analysis in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul.364 That case involved a municipal ordinance that prohibited
"disorderly conduct" that "arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. 3 65 The
Court struck down the ordinance because it was content-based, but
the opinion by Justice Scalia made another important point. Unpro-
tected speech such as "fighting words," he wrote, may not be freely
regulated without regard to "their distinctively proscribable con-
tent. ' 366 In that regard, he compared fighting words to a "noisy sound
truck. ' 367 Each is a "mode of speech. '36 The Court's reasoning, es-
sentially, was that regulating a "medium" for reasons unrelated to its
special category violates the First Amendment.
This is not to suggest that new communications technologies
should borrow a First Amendment standard from the area of commer-
cial speech or the fighting words doctrine.3 69 The point of these cases
362. Some might suggest that this case is distinguishable from one that examines the
constitutional status of a transmission medium because Discovery Network involved con-
tent discrimination. But this misses the essential point. The City of Cincinnati was not
censoring commercial speech; its rules were based on the physical means of distribution the
placement of machines on public rights of way. The editorial content of the handbills was
not affected and no restrictions were placed on distribution by other means. Discovery
Network, then, stands for the proposition that the government cannot regulate a means of
speech distribution unless there is a close connection between the regulatory purpose and
the method chosen to advance it.
363. Other commercial speech cases provide further support. In Edenfield v. Fane, 113
S. Ct. 1792 (1993), the Court struck down a Florida ban on in-person solicitations by CPAs.
The issue there was not the message, but the method of communication. "This case comes
to us testing the solicitation, nothing more." Id. at 1797. The Court found that "[e]ven
under the First Amendment's somewhat more forgiving standards for restrictions on com-
mercial speech," this regulation of the chosen medium did not advance the state's interest
in a "direct or material" way. Id. at 1801-02, 1804. Similarly, in Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994), the Court struck down a state
restriction on a lawyer advertising her additional credentials as a CPA. As in Edenfield,
the Court held that the state failed to meet its burden of proof. Id. at 2091-92.
364. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 2543.
367. Id. at 2545.
368. Id.
369. However, it is clear from the cases just discussed that the Court is beginning to
apply strict scrutiny to ensure that First Amendment interests are not infringed even where
speech has traditionally received less protection. In many ways, the important question is
not which test the Court will use, but the rigor with which it will apply the test. Conse-
quently, the more stringent scrutiny now being applied in commercial speech cases is inter-
esting in that the Central Hudson test has its roots in the O'Brien analysis. O'Brien,
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is that the First Amendment requires close scrutiny of speech regula-
tion to ensure that the government's reach does not extend beyond
the special needs that give rise to the state's concern. This is true even
for areas of First Amendment law that historically have received less
protection. However, for some reason, these very basic principles can
be overlooked in cases involving new communications technologies.
It is often the case that, after concluding that a given medium receives
less protection, courts do not examine whether government regula-
tions are in any way related to the "special" characteristic of the
technology.
This certainly has been the case for cable television. As lower
courts have awaited the Supreme Court's pronouncement on the ap-
propriate standard for the technology of cable, they have nevertheless
had to decide the cases before them. Predictably, they have differed
on the proper analytic framework, and-just as predictably-they
have provided varying levels of constitutional protection. Some
courts, citing "differences between cable television and the nontelevi-
sion media"37 adopted a de facto, albeit unarticulated, standard that
accorded less constitutional protection for cable television than for
other media.
The most common justification for different constitutional treat-
ment of cable television is that it uses public rights of way for the
distribution of its signals. 371 The level of "physical disruption" in-
volved in constructing a cable system, in this view, gives local authori-
ties a legitimate need for some control.372 Other courts have focused
more on economic characteristics attributed to the cable medium and
concluded that "natural monopoly" characteristics provide constitu-
however, has been notorious for the "lax and deferential way it has been used." Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 647
(1991); see also Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Inci-
dental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 787-88 (1985).
While it would clearly be appropriate to simply abandon the use of O'Brien in cases involv-
ing direct regulation of communications media, one scholar has suggested that O'Brien
could be rehabilitated to be "essentially equivalent to strict scrutiny." Williams, supra, at
707. Recent experience with commercial speech indicates that this approach is plausible.
As described in more detail in the text, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445, is an example of this more rigorous approach. Compare also
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
370. Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982).
See also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-80 (10th
'Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1001 (1982).
371. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1374, 1377. See generally James A. Al-
bert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 508-
13 (1977).
372. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-78.
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tional justification for extensive franchising regulation.373 In Chicago
Cable Communications .v. Chicago 'Cable Commission,374 for example,
the Seventh Circuit held that the local government could compel the
cable operator to telecast four and one-half hours per week of "local
origination" programming on the theory that "[c]able programming,
like other forms of the electronic media, is an economically scarce me-
dium. '3 75 At least one court has held that the commercial aspects of
the cable television business support a lower level of constitutional
scrutiny. In Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie,376 the dis-
trict court found that First Amendment protection was "diminished"
where the "distribution of cable signals [was] performed for the reali-
zation of profits" and held that the local government could charge the
cable operator franchise fees for the purpose of raising municipal
revenue.
377
Ultimately, however, the various rationales are tied to use of pub-
lic rights of way. As Judge Richard Posner explained the natural mo-
nopoly theory,378 the local authorities have an interest in establishing
an exclusive franchise to the extent the market will support only one
operator.379 Where this is the case, the government may prevent re-
peated disruption of the streets.38 ° Other courts have been skeptical
of the analysis. The Ninth Circuit has described the natural monopoly
theory as "just another way of expressing the city's interest in avoiding
traffic disruption and visual blight" which are "no more compelling
[under the] rubric of natural monopoly."' 381 In any event, a monopoly
created by a system of local franchising is not very natural.
The common thread in these decisions is their tendency to apply a
First Amendment theory akin to the broadcast model without ex-
pressly adopting a new standard.382 The holdings are diametrically
opposed to the traditional First Amendment position that economic
373. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 715-17
(8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 128; Commu-
nity Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-80.
374. 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
375. Id. at 1550.
376. 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir.
1988).
377. Id. at 597.
378. Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 128.
381. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1332 (9th
Cir. 1994).
382. In at least one case, the court was more forthcoming about its use of a different
constitutional standard that "split the difference" between the level of protection provided
to broadcasting and print. In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, No.
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conditions affecting media access are irrelevant to the speaker's con-
stitutional status.383 The Erie Communications court simply confused
the concept of commercial speech, which receives less constitutional
protection, with speech that is sold commercially, which is fully pro-
tected.3" The decisions also are typified by a failure by the courts to
analyze specific characteristics of cable television markets and to iden-
tify a nexus with the governmental controls approved.
Courts using a traditionalist perspective, on the other hand, have
proceeded from the premise that "the core values of the First Amend-
ment clearly transcend the particular details of the various vehicles
through which messages are conveyed." '85 In Quincy Cable, the D.C.
Circuit examined "the distinctive features" of cable television and re-
jected the argument that cable operators' use of public right of way to
attach wires justifies a lower level of constitutional scrutiny:
No doubt a municipality has some power to control the placement
of newspaper vending machines. But any effort to use that power as
the basis for dictating what must be placed in such machines would
surely be invalid.386
The court also determined that the purported natural monopoly char-
acteristics of cable television would not support a lower level of First
Amendment protection.387
A number of courts have applied traditional concepts to local
franchising controls regulations that go to the heart of the differences
between cable television and other media.388 For example, in Pre-
CV 83-5846 (CBM) 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20205, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1990), the court
stated:
The programming of a cable television network, like the publishing of a newspa-
per, involves editorial discretion. Moreover, unlike broadcast, cable television
does not require use of the airwaves. However, the Court recognizes the poten-
tial for disruption of the public domain inherent in stringing coaxial cables along
the City's utility poles and conduits. Accordingly, the Court places the medium
of cable television in between the broadcast media and the print media on the
governmental regulation continuum, however closer to the print media.
Id.
383. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974). See WILLIAM
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 73-75 (1984).
384. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1512 (1993); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
150 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
385. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (1985).
386. Id. at 1449.
387. Id. at 1450. The court took the same approach toward must-carry rules in Century
Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
388. To the extent cable television constitutes a media monopoly, its impact is felt in the
local franchise area. Moreover, problems of physical disruption of public rights of way
occasioned by cable installation are uniquely local in nature. Thus, if a separate constitu-
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ferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,389 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an exclusive
franchising arrangement violated a prospective cable operator's con-
stitutional rights.3 ° Moreover, various additional franchising require-
ments, including an exclusive franchising policy, public access
requirements, service and channel requirements were held to be inva-
lid under the First Amendment in Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of
Santa Cruz.39'
The basic presumption of these cases is that there must be some
essential nexus between an asserted governmental interest and the
unique characteristics of cable television. The analysis begins with the
premise that "unless cable television differs in some material respect
from the print media, the First Amendment standards that apply to
newspapers apply with equal force to cable. ' '39  Although the courts
acknowledged some of the obvious physical differences between the
media, for First Amendment purposes they found that the govern-
ment bears the burden of demonstrating that the characteristics of
cable support greater governmental intrusion.393 Even with some type
of demonstration, permissible franchising requirements were limited
by the principle that "a particular characteristic of a given form of
expression can only justify government regulation aimed at addressing
that particular characteristic.
' 394
One implication of this analytic approach is that First Amend-
ment analysis varied according to the nature of the franchising restric-
tion under consideration. Thus, rules that affected the editorial
control of the operator, such as public access requirements, were sub-
jected to strict constitutional scrutiny.395 Similarly, franchise fee re-
quirements were subjected to the stringent review accorded
tional standard should be applied to cable television, franchising issues provide the neces-
sary governmental interest.
389. 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994).
390. Id. at 1334. District courts reached the same conclusions in Pacific West Cable Co.
v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987), and Century Fed., Inc. v. City of
Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
391. 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987); for analysis of exclusive franchising see id. at
961-67; for analysis of public access requirements see id. at 968-69; and for analysis of
channel requirements see id. at 969-71.
392. Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 961; Century Fed., 648 F. Supp. at 1470.
393. Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 961; Century Fed., 648 F. Supp. at 1477.
394. Pacific West Cable, 672 F. Supp. at 1332; Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 961;
Century Fed., 648 F. Supp, at 1474-75.
395. Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 968-69.
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discriminatory taxation of newspapers.396 On the other hand, the
more lenient O'Brien test was applied to franchise requirements that
controlled "non-speech elements of First Amendment conduct.
397
But the choice between strict and fairly lenient scrutiny was made
with the understanding that cable television is a First Amendment me-
dium and that its communicative abilities can be impaired by exces-
sive regulation. Thus, the court in Group W Cable strictly scrutinized
technical regulations relating to channel capacity, signal quality, mix
of programming, institutional service, and service extension to outly-
ing areas as analogous to
legislation requiring a newspaper to print a minimum number of
pages, use paper and ink of only a certain quality, cover a specified
range of subjects, print information and data of interest to govern-
ment and institutional readers free of charge, provide free subscrip-
tions to government and institutional readers, and offer home
delivery to any subscriber residing anywhere in the community at a
price fixed by the government. 396-
Such requirements, the court ruled, are invalid under traditional First
Amendment analysis.399
The Supreme Court's opinion in Turner Broadcasting struck a
balance between the minimal and strict constitutional scrutiny applied
by the lower courts. While the Court expressly rejected both a ra-
tional basis approach associated with generally applicable economic
regulation and a standard similar to that applied to broadcast regula-
tion, it stopped short of treating cable television the same as tradi-
tional media.4" Instead, it applied the intermediate level of scrutiny
articulated in O'Brien because of the physical characteristic that per-
mits cable to serve as a "bottleneck," controlling access by subscribers
to television signals.4"1 Of special importance was the Court's refusal
to establish a special constitutional standard for cable television. It
stressed that "whatever relevance these physical characteristics may
have in the evaluation of particular cable regulations, they do not re-
quire the alteration of settled principles of our First Amendment juris-
prudence.'"4°2 Thus, the level of scrutiny was governed by the facts
before the Court, not by the relative "newness" of cable technology.
396. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 875, 887-88 (N.D.
Cal. 1988). But see Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 973 (applying the less restrictive
O'Brien test to determine validity of franchise fee).
397. Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 962.
398. Id. at 970.
399. Id.
400. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994), vacating and
remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
401. Id. at 2468-69.
402. Id. at 2457 (emphasis added).
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Presumably, as other means of transmitting the same programming to
subscribers emerge and eliminate any "bottleneck," the level of scru-
tiny will increase.
Additionally, the Court subjected the must-carry rules to far
more rigorous scrutiny than is often associated with intermediate level
review. In the face of detailed statutory findings, the Court neverthe-
less found it was unable to determine the constitutionality of must-
carry rules "in the absence of findings of fact from the District
Court."403 In particular, it held that the government must provide evi-
dence that local television stations have gone bankrupt without the
protection of must-carry rules, that broadcasters have curtailed their
operations, experienced a serious reduction in revenues or had to turn
in their licenses.404 This finding requires more proof from the govern-
ment than courts often require under O'Brien, and it is orders of mag-
nitude beyond the traditional standard of proof in broadcast cases.4 °5
Although this issue will not be resolved until the Supreme Court ulti-
mately rules on the constitutionality of must-carry rules based on a
full factual record, the Turner Broadcasting decision suggests that the
Court is approaching cable television cases from a more traditionalist
view.406
B. Evaluating the Alternatives
1. Incrementalism and the End of History
To the extent the incrementalist approach has not been refuted
already by experience, it has been the subject of a continuing aca-
demic debate. Professor Powe compiles numerous examples of polit-
ical abuses of "the licensed half of the press" that he concludes are
"wholly inconsistent with a concept of freedom of expression., 40 7 An-
other critic, Matthew Spitzer, also cites the problem of governmental
403. Id. at 2460, 2471.
404. Id. at 2472.
405. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 110-
111 (1987) (exhaustive study revealed no examples in which O'Brien balancing resulted in
the invalidation of an incidental restriction of speech). Cf. FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,796-97 (1978). There, the Supreme Court upheld a
newspaper-broadcast station cross-ownership ban based on an "inconclusive[] .
rulemaking record" that lacked "evidence of specific abuses by common owners." Id. The
Court found it sufficient for the FCC to "rely on its judgment, based on experience." Id. at
797.
406. See supra note 369.
407. PowE, supra note 38, at 248. Powe regards Bollinger's thesis that the government
may treat broadcasting differently because "we think there are differences" as representing
"the Walter Cronkite school of regulation 'that's the way it is."' Id. at 213 (emphasis in
original).
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abuse, and argues further that regulating one medium but not another
,"skews the distribution of values served in favor of those people who
strongly prefer receiving one medium or the other."4 '8 Bollinger pub-
lished his answer to these criticisms in his book, IMAGES OF A FREE
PRESS, and reaffirmed his rather immodest belief that "the partial reg-
ulation thesis [is] the best means of understanding both the rationale
for and the nature of the system of the press freedom that has evolved
during this century."409
It is beyond the scope of this Article to reargue the points that
have been made in this on-going debate. It is, however, certainly pos-
sible to dispute some of the conclusions, such as the claim that the
government's proper role is "to instruct other branches of the media
... in proper journalistic standards," but the most important concerns
are the effects of incrementalism on the development of First Amend-
ment law, and its prospects for the future.410 The fact that the law has
developed in fits and starts under the incrementalist approach has led
to a general devaluation of the First Amendment as courts experiment
with "intermediate" theories. As a general matter, the theory of par-
tial regulation tends to vastly underestimate the loss to freedom of
expression. Moreover, the convergence of media represents some-
thing of an "end of history" for incrementalism, as it tends to make
partial regulation more difficult to implement.
First, however, it is impossible to pass beyond these prior argu-
ments without noting Bollinger's rather detached attitude toward pos-
sible abridgements of constitutional rights. It is permissible for the
government to single out broadcasters or other electronic speakers for
special disfavored treatment, he concludes, because society generally
is allowed to choose some of its members "to bear the burdens of
needed, but only partial, reforms. 4 11 Although Bollinger is correct
that legislatures are allowed to address one portion at a time of a gen-
eral problem, they are barred from doing so at the expense of funda-
mental rights. To extend this logic, Congress may have a compelling
408. SPlrzER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS, supra note 340, at 46.
409. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 116. Bollinger set out a six-point response to Powe,
arguing that his concern over government censorship was overstated, that he failed to con-
sider alternatives short of abolishing public regulation, and that he did not consider the
effects of private censorship. Id. at 128-31. With respect to Spitzer's concerns about the
"crossover audience" between media, Bollinger argued that more empirical data was
needed to assess this concern, but that it did not detract from the benefits that public
regulation brings to the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 198-99. For a further critique of Bol-
linger's thesis, see Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Content
Regulations, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 93, 206-11 (1992).
410. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 119.
411. Id. at 118.
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interest in reducing crime, but would not be permitted to accomplish
this goal by passing legislation to suspend Fourth Amendment rights
of a specific socioeconomic group.
Despite Bollinger's perceptive discussion of the dangers to free
speech inherent in regulation, he rather curiously treats the courts' use
of "a conception of [the First Amendment for broadcasting] thor-
oughly rejected elsewhere" as if it were insignificant.412 For example,
he dismisses Powe's meticulous documentation of governmental
abuses by saying that the government did not always accomplish its
censorial purposes, but even if it did so in the past, there is no evi-
dence it will attempt to subvert the press in the future.413 Of course,
in a broader discussion of the First Amendment these same points
could be made about the trial of John Peter Zenger. But that is hardly
a reason to relax the constitutional bar against government control
over the press.41 4
Bollinger is exceedingly tolerant of other clear examples of polit-
ical overreaching. Presented with the well-documented campaign by
the Democratic National Committee to silence certain right-wing ra-
dio personalities, he merely notes that the purpose of the fairness doc-
trine is to provide balance through a system of listener complaints.1 5
Perhaps so, but the government's good intentions are not very com-
forting in light of the fact that official scrutiny of programming con-
tent caused hundreds of radio stations to drop shows to avoid fairness
doctrine complaints.41 6 Similarly, Bollinger forgives President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's efforts to keep newspaper owners from acquiring
radio stations. While he acknowledges that Roosevelt acted for the
"wrong reasons," to dampen the anti-New Deal sentiments of the
publishers, Bollinger describes the government's action as "not inher-
ently bad" because current cross-ownership rules are "widely ap-
plauded for increasing diversity of media ownership. ' 417 Somewhere,
412. Id. at 130-31.
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON xix-lxxix (Leo-
nard W. Levy ed., 1966).
415. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 130.
416. FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GuYs AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 41-42, 78-83 (1976); PowE, supra note 38, at 112-117.
417. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 130. In fact, ownership rules were relaxed after the
FCC concluded that most radio stations were losing money and that the multiple owner-
ship rules were not helping to preserve the medium. Congress is now considering relaxa-
tion of the radio-newspaper cross-ownership rules.
1994]
Huey Long is smiling at the thought that the ends justify the
motives.418
Bollinger concedes that the government has gone too far in regu-
lating broadcast indecency, 419 but evidently does not consider this to
be a large concession. The FCC's regulation of indecent broadcasts
has become increasingly aggressive. In early 1994, the Commission
approved the transfer of KRTH(FM) to Infinity Broadcasting Corpo-
ration, an owner of multiple radio stations and employer of radio per-
sonality Howard Stern.42 ° But it did so only after delaying the $110
million acquisition beyond the closing date, fining the broadcaster
$400,000 for Stern's "indecent" broadcasts, and warning Infinity that
"further violations might provoke more stringent penalties than mon-
etary forfeitures. ' 421 The FCC also stressed that the decision "is with-
out prejudice to any actions the Commission may deem appropriate
should Infinity broadcast indecent material in the future. '422 In other
words, the licenses of the nearly twenty Infinity-owned stations are on
the line. All together, the Commission has issued Notices of Appar-
ent Liability for Infinity approaching $1.7 million,423 and lesser
418. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (imposition of a tax only
on larger newspapers in a state, presumably based on their opposition to the Governor's
policies, held to violate the First Amendment).
419. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 131. "I agree, for example, that the commission
and the courts, including the Supreme Court, have been insensitive to freedom of speech
and press interests in the area of regulation of 'indecent' language." Id.
420. In re KRTH(FM), Los Angeles, CA, Assignment of License, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 743 (1994).
421. Id.; see also Letter from William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC, to Mel
Karmazin, Pres., Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 9 FCC Rcd. 1746 (1994); Letter from William
F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC, to Mel Karmazin, Pres., Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 8
FCC Rcd. 6740, 6741 (1993). The delay of the closing reportedly increased the price of the
station by more than $6 million. See Six-Million-Dollar Man, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 82.
422. In re KRTH(FM), Los Angeles, CA, Assignment of License, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 743 (1994). The assignment of license was approved by a very shaky 2-1 vote. Commis-
sioner Ervin Duggan issued a concurring statement with the reservation that absent the
need to clarify a recent court decision on the Commission's indecency enforcement poli-
cies, "I would have denied the grant of this application [and] would have supported the
launching of an administrative hearing at the Commission to determine whether the pat-
tern of enforcement actions incurred by Infinity Broadcasting Corporation raises funda-
mental questions about Infinity's fitness to remain an FCC licensee." Id. at 750
(concurring statement of Commissioner Duggan). Commissioner James Quello dissented,
writing that "it is antithetical to the public interest to authorize additional stations for
probable dissemination of gross indecency and possible obscene broadcasts by Stern." Id.
at 746-47 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Quello).
423. Id. at 746. See also Letter from William F. Caton to Mel Karmazin, supra note 421,
at 1746; Letter from William F. Caton to Mel Karmazin, supra note 421, at 6741; In re
Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7975
(1993); In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC
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amounts for a growing number of other radio licensees since it an-
nounced a more proactive enforcement policy in 1987.
The broadcast experience with indecency enforcement should be
considered carefully, since Congress has extended its reach to tele-
phone communication,424 and (to a lesser extent) cable television. In
addition, the Clinton Administration proposed applying the same reg-
ulatory restrictions on the National Information Infrastructure, and
provisions of S. 1822 were drafted to bring certain anti-indecency rules
"into the digital age."425 Bollinger generally disparages the camel's-
nose-in-the-tent argument for "suffer[ing] badly from overuse,"
although he acknowledges that it can have "powerful force. '426 This
is such a case. Not only has the government generally expanded its
anti-indecency policy across various media, it has also expanded the
subject matter. Case law supporting indecency enforcement has been
the centerpiece of justifications for regulating televised violence.
427
Moreover, the FCC's special concern for the needs of children, the
bedrock principle underlying the indecency policy, has also been used
to support an obligation that television stations add more educational
programming. While having access to more educational shows proba-
bly is a good thing, it is easy to see the trend in content controls based
on the indecency rationale. It is not so easy, however, to see any
limits.
The theory of partial regulation is predicated upon dividing up
First Amendment rights for different media, but does not appear to be
based on a clear or consistent understanding of how the law applies to
the various technologies. Bollinger asserts, for example, that there is
little danger with experimenting with regulation because with the
print media as a "benchmark" any departure from traditional First
Amendment principles will be carefully scrutinized and justified.
"The message," he concludes, "is one of adjustment rather than
Rcd. 3600 (1993); In re Applications of Cook Inlet Radio Licensee Partnership, L.P., Or-
der, 8 FCC Rcd. 2714 (1992); Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, FCC, to Mel
Karmazin, Pres., Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 8 FCC Rcd. 2688 (1992). See Christopher
Stern, FCC OKs Infinity Station Purchase, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 47.
424. 47 U.S.C. § 233(b) (Supp. IV 1992). See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989); Dial Info. Servs. Corp. of New York v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of
the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
425. S. REP. No. 367, supra note 227, at 17.
426. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 112-13.
427. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech at the NATPE/INTV Convention, Miami,
Florida (Jan. 24, 1994); Kim McAvoy & Steven Coe, TV Rocked by Reno Ultimatum,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 6, 14.
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wholesale revision.""42 But this is unsupported either by history or by
Bollinger's own assessment of the cases. For example, Bollinger
makes note of the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for regulation by
pointing to the Court's "almost totally uncritical posture" and "the
weakness of the arguments" for distinguishing the media.429
As described in Section II above, the period of "adjustment" as
courts assess the First Amendment status of new technologies tends to
be quite long and not very hospitable to First Amendment questions.
Given the unexamined acceptance of the "law unto itself" dictum,
most courts gravitate toward some sort of interim judicial test until the
Supreme Court issues an authoritative pronouncement on the proper
placement of a new medium along the First Amendment continuum.
The test of choice has become the generic standard for examining "in-
direct" speech abridgments articulated in United States v. O'Brien.43 °
This development, which has led to a general "O'Briening" of many
free expression questions, is perhaps the most unfortunate product of
incrementalism.43'
In O'Brien, the first Supreme Court case to use the term "sym-
bolic speech," the Court upheld the conviction of an individual who
burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War.432 Chief Justice
Earl Warren's opinion for the Court did not dispute that the defend-
ant was engaged in expressive conduct, but said "[w]e cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby
to express an idea. '433 The Court then gave life to the assumptions
underlying its former speech "plus" cases, stating that "when 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms.
434
The O'Brien standard has proven to be a remarkably flexible and
useful test for situations in which speech and action are combined.
428. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 115.
429. Id. at 104.
430. Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635
(1987).
431. Id.
432. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
433. Id. at 376.
434. Id. A regulation will be upheld where: (1) "it is within the constitutional power of
government;" (2) "it furthers an important or substantial government interest;" (3) the
"interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) "the incidental re-
striction on ... First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to [further the
governmental] interest." Id. at 377.
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But it is a "relatively lenient standard" '435 that is far more forgiving of
government intervention.436 Moreover, courts must determine when
the conduct element inherent in all speech acts triggers this less exact-
ing test. And, unfortunately, there is no logical method "for deter-
mining at what point conduct becomes so intertwined with expression
that it becomes necessary to weigh the State's interest in proscribing
conduct. ' 437  Without such a guidepost, the Court has been left to
grapple with this issue case by case in response to such issues as sleep
as symbolic expression,438 political contributions,439 flag burning440
and nude dancing."' The resolution of these matters provides scant
guidance for how the Court may treat future questions with which it
may be presented.442
With new media, this uncertainty has led courts to focus on the
extent to which physical activity is involved in the process of commu-
nication." 3 In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
435. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
436. Various commentators have criticized the O'Brien test, suggesting that in its appli-
cation it has become virtually a rational basis test. See Stone, supra note 405, at 110-111;
Werhan, supra note 430, at 635; Williams, supra, note 369, at 644, 645. Even Jerome Bar-
ron has complained about the tendency of courts to use "the clumsy and unsuitable
O'Brien standard for the resolution of cable problems." Jerome A. Barron, On Under-
standing the First Amendment Status of Cable: Some Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1495, 1495 (1989). Barron, however, complains that the O'Brien standard is too
strict a test. Id. at 1508-11.
437. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
438. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1984); id. at
304-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
439. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
440. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
441. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
442. The Court has not been entirely consistent in distinguishing pure speech from
speech "plus." Moreover, the Court's continuing quest to apply a different standard to
speech that includes some action component sits uneasily next to its precedents involving
charitable solicitations. Such solicitations obviously involve conduct and have as their
main object the transfer of money. But because such action is "characteristically inter-
twined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular
causes or for particular views on economic, political or social issues," it is treated as a fully
protected activity under the First Amendment. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Jo-
seph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). Moreover, the Court has expressly eschewed
any attempt to distinguish protected expression from less-protected expression, holding
that "where ... the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined we
cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phase and another test to another
phase." Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2667,2677 (1988). But
see Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (regulation of speech is permissible where
"primary purpose" is commercial).
443. See Werhan, supra note 430, at 677-78, 682. "Regardless of the health of first
amendment theory, cases must be decided. This imperative places the appeal of O'Brien in
1994]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Inc., 44 the Supreme Court noted that installation of a cable system
involves "the stringing of 'nearly 700 miles of hanging and buried wire
and other appliances necessary for the operation of its system."'"' 5
Echoing O'Brien, the Court explained that "where speech and con-
duct are joined in a single course of action, the First Amendment val-
ues must be balanced against competing societal interests."" 6 Given
this focus lower courts used O'Brien as the operative standard by
default.447
Reliance on O'Brien as an interim test has perpetuated the gen-
eral uncertainty surrounding the First Amendment status of new com-
munications technologies. In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC448 and
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC,449 for example, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that must-carry rules violate cable operators' First Amend-
ment rights using an O'Brien analysis.450 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia reached the precise opposite con-
clusion about must-carry rules in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, but the Supreme Court articulated an O'Brien approach that
may well lead to the invalidation of must-carry rules. 51 Most other
provisions of the 1992 Cable Act were upheld by the district court in
Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, once again using O'Brien as
the relevant standard.452 With respect to local franchising require-
ments, the Seventh Circuit has held that the "content-neutral" test of
O'Brien permits local authorities to compel cable operators to trans-
sharp focus. It offers an approach to decision making that avoids the normative uncer-
tainty plaguing first amendment theory and confusing free speech methodology." Id.
444. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
445. Id. at 493.
446. Id. at 495. The opinion cited Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), thus equating
cable television as "expressive conduct" with draft card burning and posting handbills. But
the Court stopped short of weighing the various factors until "we know more about the
present uses of the .public utility poles and rights-of-way and how respondent proposes to
install and maintain its facilities on them." Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 495.
447. E.g., Chicago Cable Communications, Inc. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d
1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1989); Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Daniels
Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1993).
448. 768 F.2d at 1454-62.
449. 835 F.2d at 298-304.
450. In both cases, however, the court emphasized that it was not selecting O'Brien as
the appropriate standard and that the must-carry rules failed to satisfy "even the less-de-
manding [O'Brien] test." Century Comm. Corp., 835 F.2d at 298; Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at
1454.
451. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468-69. See supra text accompanying notes
400-06.
452. 835 F. Supp. at 3-7.
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mit local origination programming to subscribers.453 In short, the out-
come of using this balancing test depends almost entirely on which
court is doing the balancing.
Moreover, the implication of relying on O'Brien in these cases is
that cable television should be subjected to some sort of First Amend-
ment balancing because cable systems require construction. But it is
difficult to understand how this fact would dictate a different ap-
proach than that applied to newspapers, which are printed in plants
that also must be built and distributed daily over public rights-of-
way.454 Installation of a cable system, like construction of a printing
plant, undoubtedly involves some temporary disruption that requires
a degree of government oversight. For example, local governments
require the issuance of building permits before significant construc-
tion projects may commence in order to protect health and safety in-
terests. There is little to suggest, however, that a legitimate concern
with local health and safety should also allow the government to pro-
mote other "competing societal interests" where the construction in-
volves the relatively unobtrusive process of laying cable for purposes
of communications.
To the extent that symbolic speech cases provide a useful analysis,
the conceptual difficulties just noted suggest that courts would gain
more insight by looking to cases decided after O'Brien. For example,
in Spence v. Washington,455 the Court focused on the communicative
intent of the act involved, not the level of physical activity needed to
convey the message. The Court protected speech so long as there was
an intent to convey an understandable message and, in context, the
message was likely to be received. 456 Thus, in Texas v. Johnson, the
Court held that the act of burning an American flag, in the context of
a political protest, was "conduct 'sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication' . . . to implicate the First Amendment" 457 and sub-
453. Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 1550-51.
454. Other than construction of the system, the Court did not suggest, and logic would
not dictate, that transmission of cable television signals constitutes "action" rather than
"speech." The closest comparable argument is Professor Emerson's conclusion that war-
time broadcasts made by the enemy in time of war should be classified as action rather
than expression. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 61
(1970). This analysis has been criticized as a "subjective judgment" that leads to "arbitrary
classifications." MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-7
(1984).
455. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
456. Id. at 410-11. "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it." Id.
457. 491 U.S. at 406 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
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jected the government's actions to "the most exacting scrutiny" re-
gardless of the degree of conduct involved.4 s8 The Court emphasized
that to justify O'Brien's less demanding rule "the governmental inter-
est in question [must] be unconnected to expression.
4 19
There is no question in the case of the media that there is an
intent to communicate by the programmer. There is also little ques-
tion that the message will be understood by the audience. Thus, to the
extent the regulation is designed in some way to improve the content
or quality of information conveyed and extend its reach or increase
the number of people who participate, it cannot be considered "un-
connected to expression." Therefore, any governmental measure
designed to regulate a medium because of its status as such should not
be considered an "incidental" restriction on speech subject to
O'Brien.46  But so long as courts continue to apply O'Brien's "con-
duct" analysis to new communications technologies, there will con-
tinue to be a general devaluation of free speech interests and an
overriding uncertainty from case to case. This is the legacy of
incrementalism.
One final point is essential. Incrementalism is predicated on the
ability to divide the media into discrete categories, such as the regula-
tory classifications that have served as a primary vehicle for First
Amendment analysis. But even Bollinger has exhibited some uncer-
tainty about how this is to be accomplished. He acknowledges that a
system of partial regulation "may be foolish in a world of extensive
cross-ownership between newspapers and broadcasters; or, in a world
... of near total domination by the electronic medium. '46 1 In addi-
tion, Pool argued that government control of new media, such as com-
puter networks, would undermine the First Amendment even if
"traditional" media remain free.462 In his view, mechanical presses,
lecture halls and messages on hand-delivered paper "may become no
more than a quaint archaism, a sort of Hyde Park Corner where a few
eccentrics can gather while the major policy debates take place else-
where. '463 For this reason, Bollinger has "moved away" from the po-
sition that partial regulation "could be applied to any portion of the
458. Id. at 412.
459. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
460. See, e.g., John P. Cole, Jr., The Cable Television "Press" and the Protection of the
First Amendment a Not So "Vexing Question," 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 347, 359-65 (1992).
461. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 120 (footnotes omitted).
462. POOL, supra note 59, at 224-25.
463. Id. See also Katsh, supra note 75, at 1483. "It is even possible that 'full' First
Amendment protection, whatever that may mean in the future, will not be enjoyed by any
medium other than, perhaps, the spoken word." Id.
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media.' '4 1 Now, he argues that "there are special advantages to limit-
ing regulation to new technologies. '465 He also argues to retain a
pure First Amendment for the technology of print, "where press free-
dom was born and has flourished.
' '1 6
Although Bollinger's willingness to acknowledge the flaws in his
theory is admirable, his response is wholly inadequate. The point that
Pool and others have made is that, except for marginal cases, there
will be no difference between the print media and the electronic me-
dia." 7 Consequently, once the government has a jurisdictional
"hook" by which to regulate print, there will be no vehicle for "limit-
ing regulation to new technologies."'  It will be of little use to have a
"benchmark" by which true free speech rights are measured if most
communication occurs in a regulated system. England still has a
Queen, but that does not mean that the Monarch rules.
2. Revisionism and the Triumph of Politics
It is somewhat ironic that a central thesis of revisionism is that
there is an overly romanticized idea of free expression in the United
States. It is suggested that "[n]ames such as John Peter Zenger, Jacob
Abrams, Irving Feiner, and Paul Robert Cohen resonate with the
Madisonian principle of free expression," but that "neither Thomas
Paine's Common Sense nor The Federalist Papers would play well on
network television. 4 69 Instead of the lone pamphleteer dedicated to
fighting the tyranny of the Crown, the mass media is comprised of
multinational corporations dedicated to converting television into
"the soma tablet of modern society.
' '470
This view is ironic because it mischaracterizes the past as well as
the present, and offers its own overly romantic view of modern gov-
ernment. It is important to keep in mind, for example, that those
paragons of freedom were, in their day, considered by mainstream so-
ciety to be cranks, outcasts, or worse. Only in retrospect is it possible
for most to conclude that Paul Cohen, a raggedy protester with his
"Fuck the Draft" jacket played an important role is preserving essen-
464. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 130-31.
465. Id. at 120.
466. Id.
467. POOL, supra note 59, at 42. "In the coming era, the industries of print and the
industries of telecommunication will no longer be kept apart by a fundamental difference
in their technologies. The economic and regulatory problems of the electronic media will
thus become the problems of the print media too." Id.
468. BOLLINGER, supra note 165, at 120; Nadel, supra note 59, at 166 n.9.
469. Collins & Skover, supra note 278, at 1090, 1094.
470. Id. at 1093.
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tial freedoms. 471 On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to treat
MacNeil-Lehrer, Nightline, All Things Considered, CNN, C-SPAN or a
host of other current examples as a natural extension of America's
free press traditions.472 A defining moment in the history of Ameri-
can journalism was Edward R. Murrow's See it Now broadcast that
contributed to the end of McCarthyism.473 The same may be said of
the Rodney King videotape.
Revisionist theorists seek a balance of power between the public
sector and the privately controlled press and point to the bigness of
the media business and the relatively benign purposes of the govern-
ment. Just as Bollinger would excuse the political manipulation of the
fairness doctrine because of the policy goal of "balance, ' 47 4 Revision-
ists tend to emphasize the government's good intentions.
It is indisputable that the size and nature of mass media has
changed since 1791, but then, the same is true of government. Media
now touches every aspect of life in the United States. To suggest that
the Framers of the Constitution could never have foreseen the techni-
cal developments involving electronic media is not a very revealing
understatement. But they did understand that "governments have a
gravitational attraction for power."475 As a result, once power is
ceded to the state, it tends to "expand continuously, regardless of orig-
inal purpose or ostensible limitations. ' 476 Nor is it possible to relax
our constitutional guard on the theory that the government's inten-
tions in the past were "bad" but now are more "benign." As Lee
Loevinger has observed:
[T]hroughout history tyrants have proclaimed worthy objectives as
the reason for their tyrannies. The inquisitors did not torture and
burn their victims because of sadistic satisfaction in watching the
suffering of others but because of an avowed, and probably sincere,
concern to save the souls of heretics.477
471. It is revealing to recall, for example, that Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cohen v.
California described the episode as an "absurd and immature antic [that] ... was mainly
conduct and little speech." 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
472. See Martin H. Redish, Killing the First Amendment With Kindness: A Troubled
Reaction to Collins and Skover, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1990). Professor Redish noted
that with "friends such as Professors Ronald Collins and David Skover, the [First Amend-
ment] right of free expression surely needs no enemies." Id. at 1147.
473. See Tom Shales, Showdown with a Senator, WASH. POST, June 15, 1994, at Cl;
Edward Walsh, When Television Took on Joe McCarthy, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at G1.
474. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
475. Loevinger, supra note 77, at 778.
476. Id. at 786.
477. Id. at 787. See also Powe, supra note 273, at 392. "It has long been assumed that
civil liberties are not lost wholesale but rather retail, at quite good prices and therefore,
initially at least, for the best of reasons." Id.
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There are few areas where the government has more good inten-
tions than the field of communications. Even apart from an ever in-
creasing desire to create federal jurisdiction over communications
industries, the government has shown an intense interest in control-
ling content for the good of society. The enforcement against "inde-
cent" broadcasting described above is one example, and it is the type
of regulation that tends to breed. Various bills proposing to control
televised violence were introduced in the 103d Congress, and have
been justified by their proponents as falling within Pacifica Founda-
tion and other indecency precedents.478 In addition, legislation to cod-
ify the fairness doctrine has again been introduced, predicated on the
continuing belief that broadcast spectrum is scarce.4 79
Whatever may be the justifications or intentions underlying the
different proposals to regulate electronic communications, history
does not support the assumption that governmental initiatives to con-
trol speech are necessarily benign. The federal government, for exam-
ple, has maintained a long tradition of discouraging dissident speech.
A 1959 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) memorandum noted
the Director's concern "about the prevalence of articles in publica-
tions which are severely and unfairly discrediting our American way
478. S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require warnings prior to programming
depicting "violence or unsafe gun practices." S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and H.R.
2159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require the FCC to evaluate and publicly report
on violence contained in television programs. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would
prohibit the telecast of violent programming at times when children are likely to be in the
broadcast audience. S. 1556, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require oversight of vio-
lent commercials and program promotions. H.R. 2609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would
create a presidential commission to investigate and propose solutions to reduce broadcast-
ing of violence on television. H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require the
FCC to establish a toll free telephone number to collect complaints regarding televised
violence. H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require the FCC to prescribe
standards to reduce violent programming on broadcast stations and cable systems and
would require license revocation for repeated violations. H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), would require new television sets to be equipped with circuitry to block the trans-
mission of violent programs (the so-called "V-chip").
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt and Attorney General Janet Reno have taken the posi-
tion that television violence legislation would be constitutional. Hundt, supra note 427.
Both have cited FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) as support for their conclu-
sions. Hundt, supra note 427.
479. See, e.g., Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1993, H.R. 1985, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 333, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Senator Hollings). One of the
legislative findings proposed in the bills-that "despite technological advances, the electro-
magnetic spectrum remains a scarce ... public resource"-may be difficult to reconcile
with provisions of S. 1822, also proposed by Senator Hollings, that would have permitted
broadcasters to transmit several channels of programming on their available frequencies.
Compare S. 333, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1) (1993) with S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 704
(1993).
of life and praising directly or indirectly the Soviet system. ' 480 Ac-
cordingly, the nation's chief policeman "questioned whether there
might not be some subversive factors in the backgrounds of some of
the prominent columnists, editors, commentators, authors, et cetera,
which could be influencing such slanted views."48'
As a result of such concerns, the FBI and other intelligence agen-
cies conducted surveillance and maintained files on such noted writers
as H.L. Mencken, Edmund Wilson, Robert Frost, Thomas Wolfe, Dor-
othy Parker, Truman Capote, Lillian Hellman, Aldous Huxley, Carl
Sandburg, Thornton Wilder and Dashiell Hammett; as well as Nobel
laureates Sinclair Lewis, Pearl S. Buck, William Faulkner, Ernest
Hemingway, John Steinbeck and Thomas Mann. 4" The FBI investi-
gated journalist I.F. Stone for four decades, and compiled thousands
of pages of files documenting the surveillance.483 Stone's published
attacks on the FBI and its Director contributed to the government's
interest in his activities. After one column in which Stone compared
the FBI to the Gestapo, J. Edgar Hoover reportedly demanded of his
agents, "What do we have on him? '' 4&4 Such tactics, however, did not
begin or end with Hoover.
The FBI has engaged in a broad range of activities designed to
undermine or disrupt legitimate political movements. In the
COINTELPRO program, the Bureau investigated, infiltrated and in-
terfered with numerous anti-war and civil rights organizations.485 Pur-
suant to this program, the FBI targeted "almost every antiwar group,
including those involved in legitimate, non-violent activities," and
others "because of their involvement in and support of civil rights.
486
COINTELPRO was designed to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit
and otherwise neutralize" members of the political opposition, includ-
ing "persons involved in nonviolent political expression, regardless of
their involvement in disorders. ''4 1 The FBI also coordinated their ac-
480. See HERBERT MITOANo, DANGEROUS DOSSIERS 22-23 (1988).
481. Id.
482. These disclosures were the result of exhaustive document searches pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act. The government kept files on many other authors in addi-
tion to those named above. See generally id.
483. Myra MacPherson, The Secret War Against LF. Stone, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1994,
at C1.
484. Id. at C4.
485. See generally Final Report of the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
Book 11 (1976) [hereinafter Senate Report on COINTELPRO].
486. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 10, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Bren-
nan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
487. See also Senate Report on COINTELPRO, supra note 485, at 177.
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tivities with munitions manufacturers by placing secret informants in-
side dissident groups to provide intelligence on planned protest
activities.4"
In another initiative known as the "Library Awareness Program,"
FBI agents recruited librarians to report the activities of patrons with
"foreign-sounding names" or "suspicious reading habits." '489 The FBI
defended the program in congressional testimony, claiming that the
agency needed to monitor the usage of twenty-one specialized librar-
ies to ensure that Soviet agents did not obtain sensitive information
damaging to national security.49° But the American Library Associa-
tion accused the FBI of seeking to infringe the First Amendment
rights of library patrons, and advised its librarian-members not to
participate.49'
It is tempting to discount such examples as isolated or as justified
by the demands of national security. But information compiled by
congressional oversight committees suggests that neither conclusion is
warranted. In 1975, there were 160,000 open FBI files on "subver-
sive" matters, representing almost 20 percent of the Bureau's total in-
vestigative resources.49 A GAO audit of the ten largest FBI offices
revealed that, of the 19,700 open subversive investigations in those
jurisdictions, only four led to findings of criminal behavior, and none
turned up evidence of espionage, terrorism or other national security
problems.493 FBI surveillance activities have been so indiscriminate
that they have included such measures as wiretaps and mail intercep-
tions of a grade school student who wrote to the Soviet Union as part
of a school project.494
It often is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the government's
primary motivation is to control public debate over controversial is-
sues. In that regard, the regulatory apparatus governing electronic
media provide a natural means of influence. Such tactics are well il-
lustrated by well-documented efforts of the Nixon White House to use
the FCC and other institutions to intimidate the broadcast networks.
An October 17, 1969 memo from Jeb Magruder to H.R. Haldeman
488. See Nat Hentoff, The FBI as Co-Conspirator, WASH. POST, May 30, 1985, at A25.
489. Jack Anderson & Joseph Spear, FBI Still Checking Out Libraries, WASH. POST,
Dec. 15, 1988, at J21; Bill McAllister, Stalking Spies in Libraries Triggers Suit Against FBI,
WASH. POST, June 3, 1988, at A15. See National Sec. Archive v. FBI, 759 F. Supp. 872
(D.D.C. 1991); MrToANG, supra note 480, at 25.
490. McAllister, supra note 489.
491. MrrOANG, supra note 480, at 25.
492. Id. at 24-25.
493. Id. at 24.




identified 21 requests from the President in a 30 day period "request-
ing specific action relating to what could be considered unfair news
coverage." Magruder had some ideas. Among them:
Begin an official monitoring system through the FCC as soon as
Dean Burch is officially on board as Chairman .... This will have
much more effect than a phone call from Herb Klein or Pat
Buchanan....
Use the anti-trust division to investigate various media relating
to anti-trust violations. Even the possible threat of anti-trust action
I think would be effective in changing their views in the above
matter.495
Similarly, Charles Colson was quite candid about the government's
intentions in a memo to H.R. Haldeman on September 25, 1970:
The networks are terribly nervous over the uncertain state of
the law, i.e., the recent FCC decisions and the pressures to grant
Congress access to TV. They are also apprehensive about us.
Although they tried to disguise this, it was obvious. The harder I
pressed them (CBS and NBC) the more accommodating, cordial
and almost apologetic they became.... They were startled by how
... we have so thoroughly monitored their coverage and our analy-
sis of it.... I think we can dampen their ardor for putting on "loyal
496opposition" type programs.
Even President Reagan, who vetoed one congressional effort to
re-enact the fairness doctrine after the FCC rescinded it, had a few
years earlier attempted to stifle dissent through regulatory action.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under William Casey filed a
fairness doctrine complaint against ABC-owned television stations for
that network's news report that the agency had sought to assassinate a
former agent. ABC aired the CIA's denials and backed off from the
story when it could not corroborate its source's claims. Nevertheless,
the agency urged the FCC to impose sanctions against ABC's owned
and operated stations, including possibly revoking their licenses.497
The FCC denied the CIA complaint. But it ominously held that the
CIA, or any governmental body for that matter, had standing to seek
penalties for "unfair" news coverage.498
Each year since 1987, when the FCC eliminated the fairness doc-
trine in a rulemaking proceeding,'legislation to recodify it has been
introduced. Not surprisingly, support for a fairness doctrine bill al-
495. David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 213 app. B at 247-48. The Magruder memorandum is reprinted in an appendix to
Judge Bazelon's article. Id.
496. Id. app. A at 244-47.
497. Corn-Revere, supra note 73, at 39.
498. In re CIA and American Legal Found. Against ABC and In re Petition for Declar-
atory Ruling by ACLE, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1544
(1985).
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ways tends to rise whenever the broadcast networks criticize Con-
gress. For example, in August 1993, trade press reports indicated that
pressure for legislation grew after ABC's PrimeTime Live ran a story
featuring House Ways and Means Committee members being enter-
tained by lobbyists in Barbados. Another PrimeTime Live report on
congressional pensions, as well as a Dateline NBC story on Capitol
Hill perks, further stoked the demand for action.499
The government's interest in exerting control over information
appears to expand with the growth of technology. For example, the
advancement of satellite technology with remote sensing capabilities
has created "potential avenues for gathering information for televi-
sion network news [that] seem unlimited."500 The federal govern-
ment, aware of the unlimited potential for news and other uses, has
sought to promote commercial applications of remote sensing technol-
ogy. But for national security purposes, it also has strived to retain
control of the information made available. Accordingly, federal law
provides that the Department of Defense and the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) review commercial applica-
tions for remote sensing satellites in order to "preserve the national
security of the United States." '' The law was changed in 1992 to give
the military greater oversight over national security issues. 50 2 Cur-
rently, the Department of Commerce is taking a more relaxed ap-
proach toward allowing commercial remote sensing ventures, but it
will continue to defer to Pentagon concerns.50 3 At the same time, the
government has explored more creative ways of exerting control. For
example, the CIA proposed restricting the ability of U.S. satellite
firms to sell high resolution photographs to news organizations and
others.5" Among its innovative ideas: entering partnerships with sat-
ellite firms "so the CIA would have some say in their operations. 5 °5
499. Congress Getting Mad... Getting Even?, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 16, 1993,
at 32. H.R. 1985, a bill to recodify the fairness doctrine, was introduced May 5, 1993 by
Representative Hefner with eight co-sponsors. The legislation gained an additional 22
sponsors on September 7, 1993, shortly after adverse network coverage of Congress. H.R.
1985, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
500. George E. Seay III, Remote Sensing: The Media, the Military, and the National
Security Establishment-A First Amendment Time Bomb, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 239 (1993).
501. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 202(b)(1), 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 4163.
502. The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 transferred management responsibil-
ities from the Department of Commerce to DOD and NASA. Id. § 2(9).
503. John Mintz, Satellite Firms Cleared to Sell Photos, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at
D1.




This desire by the government to control access to information
may have as much to do with an interest in maintaining the popularity
of its policies as it does with genuine national security concerns.5° As
demonstrated by the military's ability to shut down independent news
gathering efforts and avoid critical press coverage during the interven-
tions in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq, national security claims can have
considerable political utility.5 7 In the Persian Gulf, as in the other
campaigns, restrictions on news gathering were "widespread, ex-
tremely prohibitive and to a large degree unchallenged. ' 50  Although
press rights are subordinate to legitimate national security concerns
during time of war, "paramount among the responsibilities of a free
press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fe-
vers and foreign shot and shell."50 9 But the brief nature of this coun-
try's most recent military excursions made the government's control
over information virtually unreviewable 1 ° Moreover, if government
is given absolute power to restrict the technology of news gathering,
the constitutional balance contemplated by the First Amendment is
undermined. 1'
506. Erwin N. Griswold, who as Solicitor General unsuccessfully defended the govern-
ment's attempt to suppress the Pentagon Papers, has noted that "[iut quickly becomes ap-
parent to any person who has considerable experience with classified material that there is
massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with na-
tional security, but rather with government embarrassment of one sort or another." Erwin
N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
507. See David A. Frenznick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield: A Constitutional
Analysis of Press Access to Military Operations in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf,
23 PAC. L.J. 315 (1992); Fred W. Friendly, When War Comes, Whither the First Amend-
ment?, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 273 (1991); Howard B. Homonoff, The First Amendment and
National Security: The Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military
Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J. INr'L. L. & POL. 369 (1985); Matthew J. Jacobs, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1992);
Gara LaMarche, Managed News, Stifled Views: Free Expression as a Casualty of the Per-
sian Gulf War, 9 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RITS. 45 (1991); Seay, supra note 500, at 255-66.
508. Seay, supra note 500, at 263.
509. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring). Contrary to some critics of press coverage of the Vietnam War, a study by the U.S.
Army concluded that negative news stories did not reduce support for the war effort so
much as increases in American casualties. In addition, the study found that "press reports
were still often more accurate than the public statements of the administration in portray-
ing the situation in Vietnam." George C. Wilson, Army Study Plays Down Media's Viet-
nam-Era Impact, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 1989, at A12.
510. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nation Magazine v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
511. Along with control over information on the ground, the U.S. military during De-
sert Storm banned certain newsgathering through satellite photography and imagery. Na-
tion Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1580. However, restrictions on domestic companies that
provide commercial remote sensing capabilities ultimately are futile. International compa-
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Contrary to revisionist claims that censorship is a problem of the
past, the proliferation of computers and electronic networks has
spawned new ways in which freedom of expression may be limited. In
one California junior college, men's and women's-only computer bul-
letin boards were closed down after a regional office for the Office of
Civil Rights found that private messages posted on the men's only
board probably violated Title IX restrictions barring sexual harass-
ment. The government concluded that the offensive messages were
not protected by the First Amendment in the same way as private
conversations or postings on a physical display because the messages
were transmitted electronically. As a result, both men's-only and wo-
men's-only bulletin boards were terminated.5 12 On a larger scale (and
in another context), Professor Laurence Tribe has described opera-
tions in 1990 that involved up to a quarter of the United States Treas-
ury Department's investigators where they engaged in eavesdropping
on electronic bulletin boards in an effort to track down certain
hackers.5 13
The government's control impulses are perhaps best illustrated by
its proposal for the "Clipper Chip," an FBI plan that would require
that all telecommunications and computer equipment be designed and
manufactured to allow government monitoring. The government
would hold the "key" to control monitoring. Not surprisingly, the
proposal has drawn strong criticism from civil liberties advocates.
5 14
Additionally, as with remote sensing satellites, international develop-
ments may well undermine government efforts. If implemented, the
Clipper Chip most likely would succeed in making U.S. exports less
competitive. 5  As John Gage of Sun Microsystems recently joked, it
would be like trying to export computers with the label "J. Edgar
Hoover Inside. ' 516 Despite these concerns and the obvious practical
nies and certain foreign governments, including Russia and France, offer commercial re-
mote sensing services. Seay, supra note 500, at 250-51.
512. See Lewin, supra note 11.
513. Tribe, supra note 84.
514. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FBI DIGITAL TE-
LEPHONY PROPOSAL (1992); Mark I. Koffsky, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance Data
Stream: The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 131 (1994);
Jaleen Nelson, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and Its Effect
on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139 (1994); Adams, Clipper
Tech Draws Fire, FED. COMPUTER WEEK, June 14, 1993, at 1; John Markoff, Electronics
Plan Aims to Balance Government Access With Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1993, at Al;
John Schwartz, Law and Order, or Big Brother?, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1994, at Cl.
515. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: FEDERAL POLICY
AND ACTIONS, GAO/OSI-94-2 (Nov. 4, 1993).
516. John Gage, Luncheon Address at the Freedom Forum First Amendment Center
and National Emergency Civil Liberties Foundation Conference, Arlington, Va. (Jan. 26,
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problems, the Clinton Administration endorsed the Clipper Chip pro-
posal,517 and in October 1994, legislation passed in both the House
and the Senate to compel telecommunications carriers to cooperate in
the interception of digital communications for law enforcement
purposes.518
Given this enormous growth in the scope and power of govern-
ment, not to mention its demonstrated willingness to manipulate the
press, strong private media institutions are necessary to serve as a
counterweight. The suggestion that media institutions have become
too powerful, either because of the size of the entities engaged in the
enterprise, or because of their pervasiveness, is antithetical to the First
Amendment's spirit and purpose. The printing press had been li-
censed in Europe precisely because it was a powerful medium of mass
communication. Its freedom was enshrined in the First Amendment
for the same reason.
Those who dislike the idea of private control of communications
should recall the past and present campaigns by the government to
intimidate and control the press. The few examples above merely
scratch the surface. To whatever extent an imperfectly competitive
market system creates risks to democratic ideals it is important to con-
sider the alternative of centralized authority. It is true that certain
communications enterprises are big businesses that dominate the mar-
kets in which they operate. But it seems ironic to complain about
media monopolies in the regulatory state when the government has
been the prime mover in creating concentrations of power. 51 9 Three
television networks dominated American television for decades be-
cause of the allocation scheme created by the FCC.52° Similarly, ex-
clusive cable television franchises grew out of local franchising
1994). See also Michael Schrage, Code Blues: Why the Clipper Chip Plan is Having Unin-
tended Effects, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1994, at B3.
517. John Mintz & John Schwartz, Clinton Backs Security Agencies on Computer Eaves-
dropping, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1994, at Al.
518. H.R. 4922, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2375, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). H.R.
4922 passed the House on October 5 and S. 2375 passed the Senate on October 7, 1994. S.
REP. No. 402, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). To help protect privacy interests, the bills "en-
sure[ ] that wiretapping technology does not become so easy as to obviate the need for
telephone company participation, which serves as a check against an end-run of the judicial
system." 140 CONG. REC. H10,773-802 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
519. POOL, supra note 59, at 247.
520. Comment, Current Problems: Television Service and the FCC, 46 TEx. L. REV.
1100 (1968); Note, UHF and the FCC: The Search for a Television Allocations Policy, 28 U.
FLA. L. REV. 399 (1976).
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policies. 21 It also is worth noting that the information infrastructure
considered by the 103d Congress was directed largely toward eliminat-
ing regulatory barriers to increased competition in telecommunica-
tions markets.
Beyond the "state monopoly" problem, one of the central flaws
of most revisionist theories is the unpredictable blank check it gives to
the government. In this sense it is the triumph of politics over consti-
tutional principle. One need only examine the various proposals to
understand the problem. Barron would allow some form of access,
while Nader and Riley would compel every broadcaster in America
(and, for that matter, every viewer and listener) to cede an hour of
prime time to its Audience Network. Sunstein would grant a right of
reply, limit advertiser influence, and reinforce existing broadcast regu-
lations. More sensitive to the risks posed by government intervention,
Geller and Hammond propose common carrier-type approaches.
5 22
Each of the proposals is a sincere and genuine attempt to address
a perceived problem. However, there is a major catch: none of the
theorists controls the political process. And, since they proceed from
a common premise-i.e. government ought to exert greater control
over communications media in service of specified values-none is in
a position to complain when eager politicians with well-honed in-
stincts for publicity step forward with ever-growing lists of values to
be served.
Well documented failures of the regulatory state at times inject a
note of caution into the debate. Sunstein, for example, proposes a
"New Deal for speech," but without the "enthusiasm for large admin-
istrative agencies." '523 This is a bit like asking for water without the
wetness. Be that as it may, Sunstein emphasizes that he "certainly
do[es] not mean to argue that large national bureaucracies should be
overseeing our system of free expression for 'political correctness' or
good content." '524 Good to his word, he prefers incentive-based strate-
gies over command-and-control regulation. Therefore, to reduce the
problem of televised violence, he endorses Senator Paul Simon's anti-
521. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327
(1994).
522. See also Bruce A. Olcott, Will They Take Away My Video-Phone if I Get Lousy
Ratings?: A Proposal for a "Video Common Carrier" Statute in Post-Merger Telecommuni-
cations, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1558 (1994).
523. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 270, at 23, 35.
524. Id. However, these cautious statements sit uneasily next to Sunstein's awareness
that the New Deal "created the modern regulatory state." Id. at 29. He adds that the New
Deal "self-consciously rejected the system of laissez-faire. It gave rise to an extensive na-




trust exemption, adopted in 1990, that permitted the networks to meet
and discuss collective measures to reduce violent content.5z
There is only one problem. Senator Simon's earlier approach is
universally regarded as a failure-a fact that led Simon and a host of
other lawmakers to threaten the networks and to propose new legisla-
tion designed to stop television violence. One bill, H.R. 2837, would
empower the FCC to prescribe standards to reduce violent program-
ming on broadcast stations and cable systems and would require li-
cense revocation for repeated violations.526 Sunstein may not believe
in command-and-control regulation, but Congress does.
3. Traditionalism and Enduring Principles
The problem of new technology predates the Constitution. In-
deed, the First Amendment was a response to the problem of new
communications technologies. It was a direct reaction to the historical
tendency of governments to seek control over the press when mass
dissemination of information threatened to extend power to those
outside the state apparatus. New issues that have been raised by the
development of electronic media could be resolved by invoking this
core principle.
Among the most pressing legal problems currently facing elec-
tronic media are how they should be classified and, by virtue of the
classification, how they should be treated under the Constitution. De-
termining the First Amendment status of the various media would, in
turn, determine how deeply Congress can intrude in broadcasters' edi-
torial decisions, how heavy a hand regulators can place on the cable
television industry, and how quickly telephone companies can enter
the video marketplace. But if there is any certainty arising from our
experience with these questions, it is that the assignment of constitu-
tional rights based on ephemeral classification schemes has been a
failure. And to seek new ways of classifying the media in an attempt
to enable the law to keep up with technology would be a futile
gesture.
The current debate is not so much whether to retain or abandon
prior approaches to analyzing new technologies. Most agree that a
new approach is needed. The question is whether to keep in place the
traditional relationship between the government and the press. This
Article attempts to describe a process for doing just that. As de-
scribed in some detail above, new communications technologies have
525. Id. at 83.
526. H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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been confronted with four recurring problems: (1) courts have pre-
sumed that new technologies are not subject to constitutional protec-
tion, and have treated each new medium as a "law unto itself;" (2)
different constitutional standards have been fashioned around the
physical characteristics and regulatory classifications for each me-
dium, the appropriateness of which breaks down over time; (3) courts
are excruciatingly slow in adapting to these changes; and (4) the dif-
fering standards create confusion and tend to degrade First Amend-
ment protections as the media converge.
The traditionalist approach, as described above, avoids each of
these pitfalls. Since each new medium is "born free," there is no pe-
riod of confusion that includes a complex search for a separate First
Amendment standard. Nor is there any need to switch to a new stan-
dard as conditions change. Courts may apply well-settled principles of
law to new circumstances as they arise. This is not intended to suggest
that such cases would be easy, or that particular attributes of a me-
dium are irrelevant to the analysis. The approach assumes that differ-
ent media may have different qualities, but treats the characteristics as
tools of analysis, not as catalysts for separate constitutional stan-
dards.527 Consequently, it ensures that First Amendment principles
do not erode with scientific advancement in the field of
communications.
This perspective has been criticized as "an abdication of responsi-
bility which leaves the problem of private censorship unaddressed.
'' s28
As debate progresses on the NII, a central theme has been the need to
avoid creating a nation of information haves and have-nots. s29 Profes-
sor Hammond has written that "the most important First Amendment
issues facing American society concern the ways that disparities in
economic resources affect access to the marketplace of ideas. ' 53° Ac-
cordingly, "the value of freedom of expression cannot be confined to
an unchecked liberty interest."
531
Such complaints miss the point. It is not that traditionalists nec-
essarily believe that the First Amendment is based on an "unchecked"
liberty interest. But the Amendment does contain an undeniable lib-
erty interest that cannot be manipulated to serve favored social goals
527. Thus, contrary to revisionist claims, the traditionalist approach recognizes "dissim-
ilarities in the effect of different media types." Collins & Skover, supra note 278, at 1112.
528. Hammond, supra note 288, at 224.
529. Paul Farhi & Sandra Sugawara, Will the 'Information Superhighway' Detour the
Poor?, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at H1.
530. Hammond, supra note 288, at 201 (quoting MARK A. GRAVER, TRANSFORMING
FREE SPEECH 13, 14 (1991)).
531. Collins & Skover, supra note 278, at 1120.
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without fundamentally changing the nature of the Constitution.
Moreover, the criticism, as stated, begs a very important question:
What "checks" are called for, and who should impose them?
Some advocate restrictions on television because of its mindless-
ness and rampant commercialism. Such concerns tend to be overly
generalized, however, and oddly anachronistic. 32 They are directed
almost exclusively against some of the practices of network television,
and they all but ignore the trends toward greater choice of program-
ming services, multimedia and interactive services. For example, on-
line computer services provide subscribers with a broad range of
reference materials, interactive forums on a broad range of topics, en-
tertainment and shopping services. The medium bears no resem-
blance to the "Vast Wasteland" that inspires some regulators, yet
would be subject to regulation because it employs a cathode ray tube,
much like television.
Nevertheless, even television bears little resemblance to televi-
sion-at least to the mass circulation, 30-share world that led Newton
Minow to coin the term "Vast Wasteland." Most Americans now re-
ceive dozens of cable television networks that address specialized in-
terests. Once inconceivable, it is now commonplace to receive
networks devoted exclusively to news, public affairs, education, fam-
ily-oriented programming, nutrition, documentaries, courtroom televi-
sion, fine arts, movies (both current and classic), sports, music, foreign
language programming, and the like. Some channels are commercial-
free; others are nothing but commercials. Additionally, even more di-
verse networks are being planned to keep up with expanding capacity
on cable television systems and other methods of delivery.
Such changes in the television landscape undoubtedly affect what
viewers get out of it. To take one small example, forty-seven states
now permit cameras in the courtroom, and surveys suggest that ex-
panded trial coverage on channels such as Court TV has contributed
to a greater appreciation of the judicial system by the public and im-
proved understanding of how the system works.5 33 This is not in-
tended to suggest that television no longer provides mindless
entertainment. It does-perhaps now more than ever-but it also in-
cludes the option to use the medium for much more. To suggest that
the banality or popularity of some television shows somehow justifies
greater government regulation is much like arguing that freedom of
the press should be suspended because more people read romance
532. Max Lerner, Some Reflections on the First Amendment in the Age of Paratroopers,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1127, 1134-35 (1990).
533. Nat Hentoff, The Courts: Not for Judges Only, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at A15.
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novels than the classics. In any event, to complain that "there isn't
anything good on TV" is not a reason to restrict the freedom and
choice of those who generally like what they watch.534
With respect to the problem of economic disparities and informa-
tion have-nots, it is important to understand that there are many First
Amendment "values" that are not necessarily addressable through the
manipulation of First Amendment law. Democracy is a primary value
served by the First Amendment, and it is a value that would be diffi-
cult to attain without an educated electorate. This does not mean,
however, that people have a constitutional right to an education. Nor
does it mean the government could constitutionally conscript book
publishers to print and distribute textbooks. It does mean, however,
that there is an important role for public policy. The creation and
support of schools, universities and libraries are affirmative acts that
are appropriate for government to take that directly serve this First
Amendment value.
This legitimate role extends as well to electronic communications.
Government historically has subsidized radio and television program-
ming through PBS and National Public Radio. Public television sta-
tions currently are devising strategies for expanding service through
such media as cable television, satellite services, fiber optics, computer
online services, microwave channels and video cassettes.53 5 The Di-
rector of the District of Columbia Public Library has written that li-
braries should be the vehicle for ensuring equitable and affordable
access to information services,536 and public libraries are beginning to
initiate programs to extend the benefits of new communications tech-
nologies to all citizens. In October 1994, the Library of Congress un-
veiled a "digital library program" to make available documents,
photographs, films, and music over the Internet.537 In a related devel-
opment, Maryland this year became the first state to provide free con-
nections to the Internet for all of its residents. The program is funded
through the state library system, and it provides numbers for Internet
access by home computer users as well as by users in public libraries.
534. See Amy E. Schwartz, The Power of the On-Off Switch, WASH. POST, June 3, 1994,
at A23.
535. JAMES TRAWRMAN & PAUL BORTZ, PUBLIC TELEVISION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE X (1994).
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27, 1994, at A27.
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Organizers of the program envision setting up kiosks in shopping
malls and supermarkets. 38
It is often said in response, however, that government does not
always provide consistent or reliable support for these institutions.5 39
Worse still, political influences can taint government decisions regard-
ing support. The controversy over funding the National Endowment
for the Arts is a clear example, and public broadcasting has had its
share of problems, as well. But the point is a revealing one. If govern-
ment cannot be trusted to fund supplemental programs without suc-
cumbing to darker impulses, why would anyone choose as the
alternative allowing greater intrusions into the realm of free speech?
To put it another way, if you cannot trust your doctor to write a pre-
scription, why would you, permit her to do brain surgery?
Access to the means of communication is an important value and
an essential component of public policy. In this regard, the nation's
common carrier system has been a vital link. It is unclear why it is
sometimes assumed that this aspect of the telecommunications system
will change as technology advances and more types of services are
available. But to the extent companies show a reluctance in the future
to continue acting as common carriers, Professor Hammond has pro-
posed that government could take an active role in providing appro-
priate incentives. If a guaranteed return on investment is not enough,
"liberal tax and financing incentives" could also be used to "en-
courage the development and maintenance" of common carrier sys-
tems."4 Such official encouragement should present no First
Amendment problem, and it directly promotes the government's pol-
icy interests in open access and universal service.
Ultimately, the traditionalist idea is that the First Amendment is
predicated on certain core values that are unaffected by the means
through which messages are communicated. A unified First Amend-
ment theory based on traditional understandings would dispense with
the quest to develop a different level of protection for each medium,
and instead would protect these core values within each technological
context presented. As Judge David Bazelon noted, vital rights are lost
when courts stray from the "'print model"' of the First Amendment
which "has proven more durable and more congenial to our national
538. Tabitha M. Powledge, Information Highway Without Tollbooths, WASH. POST, June
23, 1994, at Al.
539. See, e.g., Jacqueline Trescott, NEA Budget Sliced Over Bloodletting, WASH. POST,
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540. Hammond, supra note 288, at 221.
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political values than the 'different' First Amendment standards en-




The mass media are on the verge of a fundamental shift into the
Multimedia Age. With it, the system of regulatory and constitutional
classification that has defined the First Amendment status of elec-
tronic media will be torn asunder. That system, badly frayed and
stretched to the breaking point, simply will not be able to withstand
the simultaneous explosion and implosion that is to come. Courts will
not longer be able to delay making a decision about the First Amend-
ment status of new technologies. Events will compel action. But this
means the cases now being decided on the constitutional status of
cable television operators and telephone companies may well estab-
lish the rules for decades to come.
This analysis concludes that the traditionalist perspective is best
suited to accommodate this shift to the Multimedia Age. By aban-
doning the "law unto itself" approach, it eliminates the need to de-
velop new standards in response to new technologies. The time tested
analytical tools of traditional First Amendment analysis are flexible,
and are readily adaptable to new situations. As a result, the tradition-
alist perspective avoids the paradox created by the need to keep up
with technological change, while at the same time providing certainty.
Finally, the traditionalist perspective best preserves the First
Amendment promise that expression will remain free from official
control. Any other alternative creates too great a risk that fundamen-
tal rights will be placed at the mercy of the latest political fashions.
Government has a vital role to play in bringing informational, educa-
tional, and participatory opportunities to those least able to partici-
pate in democratic institutions. But if the government cannot sustain
the necessary political will to perform this role, then it certainly can-
not be trusted to show the necessary restraint if given a broader regu-
latory role.
541. David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media" New Directions in
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